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 1 
SHOULD RELIGIOUS GROUPS BE EXEMPT 
FROM CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS? 
Martha Minow* 
Abstract: Should a private, religious university lose its tax-exempt status 
because  it  bans  interracial  dating?  Should  a  religious  school  fire  a 
pregnant married teacher on religious grounds despite the ban against 
gender discrimination in employment? Should a religious social service 
agency be exempt from a state regulation banning discrimination in the 
delivery of social services on the basis of sexual orientation? This Article 
argues that courts and legislatures have granted and refused exemptions 
for religious groups from civil rights laws in response to historical social 
movements,  producing  the  differential  treatment  of  race,  gender,  and 
sexual orientation laws. This Article identifies avenues, informed by virtue 
ethics and value-added negotiation, for negotiating solutions other than 
full exemptions or no exemptions. Pursuing productive stances toward 
clashes over religious exemption claims is highly relevant to sustaining 
and replenishing both American pluralism and constitutional protections 
for minority groups. 
Introduction 
  Should a private religious university lose its tax-exempt status if it 
bans interracial dating?1 Should a religious school be able fire a preg-
nant married teacher because her continued work would violate the 
church’s view that mothers of young children should not work outside 
the home?2 Should a religious social service agency, such as Catholic 
                                                                                                                      
* Jeremiah Smith, Jr. Professor, Harvard Law School. Presented as the Moffett Lecture, 
Princeton Center for Human Values, and the inaugural lecture on Religion and Ethics, 
Princeton Center for the Study of Religion (May 4, 2006) and the Stephen R. Volk Lecture 
at Dartmouth College (October 30, 2006). Thanks to the audience of that lecture, partici-
pants in the Harvard Law School summer workshop series and participants at the Federal 
Judicial Center Law and Society Program (April 25, 2007), Christine Jolls, Newton Minow, 
Nancy  Rosenblum,  Bill  Rubenstein,  Joe  Singer,  Matt  Stephenson,  Laurence  Tribe,  and 
Steve Wagner for very helpful comments. For research assistance, I thank Abigail Burger, 
Jonathan Burton-Macleod, Caleb Donaldson, Kristin Flower, and Rachel Galper. 
1 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 605 (1982) (affirming the Internal 
Revenue Service’s ruling that a private school’s tax-exempt status depended on maintain-
ing a policy of nondiscrimination). 
2 See Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Schs., 477 U.S. 619, 622–23 (1986) (affirm-
ing the court of appeals judgment that, under the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Har-
 2  Boston College Law Review  [Vol. 48:1 
Charities, be exempt from a state regulation banning discrimination 
in the delivery of social services on the basis of sexual orientation?3 
Should religious organizations be exempt from civil rights laws? 
  Two mutually antagonistic answers emerge easily: 1) no one, not 
even religious organizations, should be exempt from civil rights laws; or 
2) religious groups should be exempt from regulations that otherwise 
would coerce their members to violate their religious beliefs. History 
has given us a third answer: 3) religious groups largely receive no ex-
emptions from laws prohibiting race discrimination, some exemptions 
from laws forbidding gender discrimination, and explicit and implicit 
exemptions from rules forbidding sexual orientation discrimination.4 
Neither logic nor principle explains this pattern as well as an assess-
ment of social movements and their accomplishments. The pattern of 
inconsistent treatment of race, gender, and sexual orientation reveals 
the different trajectories of social movements mobilized around each 
category, and around the contrasting sources—federal, state, or local— 
of the pertinent civil rights laws.5 Yet the pattern is disturbing to anyone 
who cares about consistent normative analysis, as well as to advocates of 
rights for women, and for gays and lesbians. 
  At the same time, there remain powerful arguments on the side of 
religious  groups  that  do  not  comply  with  secular  antidiscrimination 
norms. The justifications for constitutional commitment to free exer-
cise of religion are legible to the secular world. Exemptions of some 
sort can be justified out of respect for the liberty of conscience at the 
core of the free exercise clause, acknowledgment of the contributions 
religious  organizations  have  brought  to  individuals  and  society  over 
time,  and  prudential  avoidance  of  direct  confrontation  between  the 
government and influential religious groups over controverted issues. 
Even advocates for antidiscrimination norms may find it wise to back 
off from direct governmental regulation of religious groups’ employ-
ment practices in order to allow struggles over discrimination issues to 
proceed  internally  within  particular  religious  communities.  Changes 
would then be legitimate and meaningful if the religious group stands 
against  discrimination  in  its  employment  practices  and  programs. 
                                                                                                                      
ris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the federal courts should stay out of the matter involving Linda 
Hoskinson’s state court challenge in the state antidiscrimination commission after she was 
fired by the Dayton Christian Schools). 
3 See Patricia Wen, Catholic Charities Stuns State, Ends Adoptions, Boston Globe, May 11, 
2006, at A1. 
4 See infra notes 65–212 and accompanying text.  
5 See infra notes 213–289 and accompanying text. 2007]  Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?  3 
Avoiding direct confrontation between the government and religious 
groups over antidiscrimination norms may also appeal to civil rights 
advocates  who  identify  real  risks  of  severe  backlash  in  the  broader 
community. 
  This Article examines the issue of exemptions from civil rights laws 
for religious groups by giving attention first to its normative and politi-
cal dimensions and then to the historical developments producing the 
differential treatment of race, gender, and sexual orientation laws in 
this context.6 The Article then asks whether alternatives beyond the 
options of all exemptions or no exemptions can be pursued, and what 
stance by government and religious groups can generate such alterna-
tives.7 Besides assisting the instrumental goal of solving—or avoiding— 
complex political and legal problems, this question of stance injects the 
dimensions of virtue ethics and value-added negotiation.8 Finding more 
productive stances toward clashes over religious exemption claims is 
highly relevant to sustaining and replenishing both American pluralism 
and constitutional protections for minority groups.9 
I. The Tension 
  Even those who disagree about the answer can agree upon the 
question: how can a pluralistic society commit to both equality and tol-
erance of religious differences? Do we best serve those commitments by 
ensuring extension and application of civil rights laws throughout the 
society, or by ensuring regard and protection for the diverse practices 
and beliefs of religious communities? 
  Religiously inflected political conflicts roil areas of this country 
and permeate post-September 11 global politics.10 The conflicts re-
                                                                                                                      
6 See infra notes 65–289 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 290–388 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 372–388 and accompanying text. 
9 Whether viewed as a correction of earlier mistakes or a loss of faith in the project of 
secularism,  constitutional  law  and  public  culture  in  the  United  States  shifted  toward 
greater  permissiveness  in  public  religious  expression  and  public  aid  reaching  religious 
organizations after the 1980s than in several prior decades. See Noah Feldman, Divided 
by God: America's Church-State-Problem—and What We Should Do About It 199–
206  (2005);  Martha  Minow,  Partners,  Not  Rivals:  Privatization  and  the  Public 
Good 82–84 (2002). 
10 See, e.g., Parker v. Hurley, 474 F. Supp. 2d 261, 263 (D. Mass. 2007) (holding that 
parents who oppose a public school giving out books condoning families with same-sex 
parents do not have a federal claim); Indep. Int’l Comm’n on Kosovo, The Kosovo Re-
port: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned 33–64 (2000) [hereinafter 
The Kosovo Report]; Heather Linquist, The Reach and Limits of Cultural Accommodation: 
 4  Boston College Law Review  [Vol. 48:1 
flect and fuel tensions between members of different religious groups, 
between religious groups and nation-states, between nation-states af-
fected by the religious character of their members, and between those 
who seek and those who oppose secularism.11 Religious divisions mark, 
if not animate, many major conflicts between and within nations, his-
torically and in the present.12 Even in the United States, where violent 
confrontations  around  religious  differences  seem  improbable,  the 
contrasting views and ways of life are a focal point for contentious and 
divisive disputes.13 Can families in Lexington, Massachusetts opt out 
of the diversity book-bag program, which includes picture books de-
picting, among many kinds of families, families with two parents of 
the same sex?14 Yes, insist some parents who recently sued on this is-
sue, even as the Commonwealth of Massachusetts under its state con-
stitution prohibits exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage.15 Re-
quests for exemption may interfere with an important public policy, 
such as promoting tolerance and equal treatment for all children and 
their families.16 In Europe, disputes over dress codes affecting Muslim 
girls and women have spread.17 France forbids obvious signs of relig-
                                                                                                                      
Public Schools and Islamic Immigrants in Maine, in Just Schools (Martha Minow et al. eds.) 
(forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 2 n.3, on file with the editors). 
11 See, e.g., Richard Bernstein, Abuse of Evil: The Corruption of Politics and 
Religion Since 9/11, at 15–17 (2006); Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: 
Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat 23 (2006); Secularism and Its 
Critics 1–4 (Ranjeev Bhargava ed., 2005). 
12 See Parker, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 263; The Kosovo Report, supra note 10, at 33–64; Lin-
quist, supra note 10 (manuscript at 2 n.3, on file with the editors). 
13 See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (holding 
that there is no constitutionally adequate reason for denying civil marriage to same-sex 
couples and noting that there are strong beliefs on either side of the issue); Linquist, supra 
note 10 (manuscript at 2–3, on file with the editors). 
14 Parker, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 263. 
15 See id. 
16 On the ongoing tension between respecting free exercise of religion and protecting 
children from child abuse and neglect when their parents cite religious grounds for resist-
ing medical treatment, see generally James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Religious 
Exemptions to Child Welfare and Education Laws As Denials of Equal Protection to Children of Reli-
gious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 1321 (1996); Janna C. Merrick, Spiritual Healing, Sick Kids and 
the Law: Inequities in the American Health Care System, 29 Am. J.L. & Med. 269 (2003). 
17 See French Legislature Approves School Head Scarf Ban, Mich. Daily, Feb. 11, 2004, available 
at  http://media.www.michigandaily.com/media/storage/paper851/news/2004/02/11/Un- 
definedSection/French.Legislature.Approves.School.Head.Scarf.Ban-1422207.shtml  [here 
inafter French Legislature] (“The ban on religious attire in classrooms, which also includes 
Jewish skullcaps and large Christian crosses, was approved 494–36 despite protests and criti-
cism from around the world. The measure goes early next month to the Senate, where there 
is little opposition. The ban was expected to take effect in September. Applying the law could 
be the real test: Critics say it’s too vague and will inflame anti-French feelings among the 
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ion by students in state-run schools and therefore bans headscarves.18 
Even though American public schools allow girls to wear a head cov-
ering, some U.S. schools struggle over how to accommodate Muslim 
girls in physical education requirements because of their requests for 
modest dress or activities in female-only spaces.19 
  The state and local governments have expanded exemptions for 
religious groups when their activities bump up against property and 
sales  taxes,20  unemployment  benefits,21  pension  law  requirements,22 
collective bargaining,23 and day-care licensing24 requirements. The spe-
cial treatment of religious groups is striking especially given the denial 
of  comparable  exemptions  to  secular  nonprofit  organizations,25  al-
though the constitutional roots of religious free exercise offer a ration-
ale for this different treatment. Moreover, exemptions are not required 
                                                                                                                      
nation’s large Muslim minority.”). For an insightful analysis of this development, see gener-
ally John Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, The State, and Pub-
lic Space (2007). 
18  See  French  Legislature,  supra  note  17;  see  also  Richard  Moran  &  Juliana  Menasee 
Horowitz,  Europeans  Debate  the  Scarf  and  Veil,  Pew  Res.  Center  Publications,  Nov.  20, 
2006, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/95/europeans-debate-the-scarf-and-the-veil. 
19 Linquist, supra note 10 (manuscript at 29–30, on file with the editors). 
20 Diana B. Henriques, As Religious Programs Expand, Disputes Rise over Tax Breaks, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 10, 2006, at A1 [hereinafter Henriques, As Religious Programs Expand] (noting 
exemptions  claimed  by  Catholic  retirement  community  for  affluent  residents,  Bible 
Theme Park, religiously-affiliated fitness center, with some disputes pending, and some 
generating legislative exemptions); Diana B. Henriques, Religion-Based Tax Breaks: Housing 
to Paychecks to Books, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 2006, at A1 [hereinafter Henriques, Religion-Based 
Tax Breaks] (discussing tax exemption for clergy housing and, in some states, for sales tax 
related to sales of religious publications); Diana B. Henriques, Where Faith Abides, Employees 
Have Few Rights, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 2006, at A1 [hereinafter Henriques, Where Faith Abides] 
(citing litany of occasions where recent court decisions have applied the so-called ministe-
rial exception under the First Amendment; shielding religious employers from most em-
ployee lawsuits). 
21 Henriques, Religion-Based Tax Breaks, supra note 20. 
22 Id. 
23 Henriques, Where Faith Abides, supra note 20. 
24 Diana B. Henriques, Religion Trumps Regulation as Legal Exemptions Grow, N.Y. Times, 
Oct. 8, 2006, at 1 (discussing state statutes exempting religiously-affiliated but not other 
nonprofit day care programs from licensing requirements). More disputed are efforts by 
religious groups to gain exemptions from land use plans and regulations. Diana B. Henri-
ques, Religion-Based Tax Breaks, supra note 20. For an argument that sex discrimination laws, 
as well as general tort and criminal laws, should apply to religious groups, see generally 
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Tension Between Sex Equality and Religious Freedom (Univ. of Chi. Pub. 
Law, Working Paper No. 167, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=995325. 
25 See Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals? Redrawing the Lines Between Public and Private, 
Non-Profit and Profit, and Secular and Religious, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 1061, 1084 (2000). 6  Boston College Law Review  [Vol. 48:1 
by the Constitution from neutral laws that do not target religious prac-
tice or belief.26 
  More difficult problems arise when religious groups seek exemp-
tion, not just from taxes or licensing requirements, but from civil rights 
laws.27 Then religious accommodation collides not only with general 
public policies to share tax burdens, ensure safety, and produce sensi-
ble land use, but also clashes with antidiscrimination norms that are 
as normatively supported as religious freedom.28 The difficulty is ex-
emplified  by  the  definition  of  “civil  rights.”  “Civil  rights”  include 
rights that are potentially at odds with one another. The term refers to 
not only the hard-won bans against racial subordination and gender-
based and sexual orientation-based discrimination; it also safeguards 
the free exercise of religion.29 
  In the United States, civil rights include the post-Civil War consti-
tutional amendments abolishing slavery and requiring the states to en-
sure equal protection and due process of the laws, as well as the 1964 
Civil Rights Act, which guards against discrimination in employment, 
housing, public accommodations, and federally-funded programs on 
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.30 Federal leg-
islation further protects people against discrimination on the basis of 
disability and age,31 and many states and municipalities have enacted 
laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in 
employment and housing.32 Civil rights also encompass the protections 
of individual liberty, including freedom of speech, freedom of associa-
tion, freedom of the press, and free exercise of religion. Hence reli-
gious groups (and individuals) can and often do confront conflicts be-
tween  their  own  free  exercise  of  religion  and  the  state’s  mandates 
against discrimination.33 
                                                                                                                      
26 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). 
27 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 605 (1982) (affirming the In-
ternal  Revenue  Service’s  ruling  that  a  private  school’s  tax-exempt  status  depended  on 
maintaining a policy of nondiscrimination). 
28 See id. at 603. 
29 See American Heritage College Dictionary 264 (4th ed. 2002) (“The rights be-
longing to an individual by virtue of citizenship, esp. those guaranteed by the 13th and 
14th Amendments to the US Constitution and by subsequent acts of Congress, including 
civil liberties and freedom from discrimination.”). 
30 See generally U.S. Const. amend. XIII, XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2000). 
31 See generally Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101; Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000). 
32 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-81e (2004). 
33 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 603. 2007]  Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?  7 
  Such conflicts reflect the crucial plurality of the good that we 
pursue. We rightly want to recognize the fundamental equality of each 
person, and the respect owed as a result. This respect includes indi-
viduals’ religious and conscientious beliefs.34 We also should acknowl-
edge the significance of organizations other than the government and 
the family, such as religions, fraternal associations, and political or-
ganizations, in which people explore and express their commitments, 
practice self-government, take care of one another, and contribute to 
the larger society.35 Democracy and its protection of individual rights 
thus are nourished by these elements of civil society even as associa-
tional, expressive, and religious freedoms depend upon the ongoing 
vigilance of constitutional democracy. 
  But plural goods can and do clash. Ensuring equal respect along 
lines of race, sex, and sexual orientation can conflict with protection 
of religious freedom.36 Conflicts arise for the Catholic nurse who does 
not want to assist in abortions and the Orthodox Jewish landlord who 
does not want to rent to a same-sex couple. During the debate over 
Justice  Samuel  Alito's  nomination  to  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court,  his 
supporters emphasized his decision for the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit in 1999 in Fraternal Order of Police v. Newark as an ex-
ample of his sensitivity to civil rights.37 His opinion for the appellate 
panel held that the city of Newark violated the free exercise rights of 
Sunni Muslim police officers by refusing to exempt them from the 
police department’s no-beard policy.38 
  Accommodations for individuals claiming religious grounds raise 
new  problems.  If  the  government  makes  an  accommodation  for 
members of a religious group—if the police department of Newark 
allows Sunni Muslim officers to wear beards—it may then seem to be 
favoring  members  of  that  religion  over  others  who  would  like  the 
                                                                                                                      
34 Plural commitments even lead to debates over the conception of the person at the 
heart of constitutional protections, such as when Steven Smith argues for a conception of 
the person as believer, he exposes competing conceptions that do not emphasize or even 
attend to individuals’ religious selves. See Steven D. Smith, Believing Persons, Personal Believ-
ings: The Neglected Center of the First Amendment, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1233, 1255–81 (contrast-
ing conceptions of the person as autonomous or as part of societal utility maximization 
with the person in search of transcendent meaning). 
35 See generally Community Works: The Revival of Civil Society in America (E.J. 
Dionne ed., 1998). 
36 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 603; Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 947 (3rd Cir. 
1991); Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 5 
(D.C. 1987). 
37 170 F.3d 359, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). 
38 Id. 8  Boston College Law Review  [Vol. 48:1 
same accommodation but have a lifestyle, health, or ethical reason 
rather than a religious one.39 Indeed, many African-American men 
have a medical condition that makes shaving a problem; should they 
too get an exemption from the police department’s no-beard policy?40 
Unless there is equal treatment for secularists who have health, life-
style, or conscientious objections, an accommodation for the Muslim 
officers could be unfair favoritism or a new kind of discrimination.41 
  Yet  each  additional  exemption  from  a  general  rule  further  un-
dermines  the  governmental  purposes  behind  its  rule.  The  no-beard 
policy may not seem especially powerful, but how about exemptions 
from civil rights laws themselves?42 Individuals may not only seek ex-
emptions for themselves43 but also try to strike down a civil rights law as 
Dr. J. Barrett Hyman did in 2001, when he sought the right to discrimi-
nate against gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered people in em-
ployment in his medical practice and challenged local civil rights laws 
along the way.44 He challenged Kentucky municipal ordinances ban-
ning sexual orientation discrimination in employment as both vague 
                                                                                                                      
39 See id.; Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1993)( Domino’s Pizza 
failed to prove that a business justification existed for its no-beard policy; earlier proceedings 
established that the no-beard policy had a disparate impact on African-American males suf-
fering from pseudofolliculitis barbae (“PFB”), a skin condition which often makes shaving 
difficult and painful). 
40 See Bradley, 7 F.3d at 796. 
41 See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The 
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1245, 1286 (1994) 
(arguing for constitutional protection of minority beliefs rather than privilege in the form 
of religious exemptions, an approach the authors characterize as open to abuse); see also 
Eugene  Volokh,  Intermediate  Questions  of  Research  Exemptions:  A  Research  Agenda  with  Test 
Suites, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 595, 600–01 (1999). For a contrasting view emphasizing relig-
ion’s special role in addressing the human condition and the difficulty separating protec-
tion of religion from preference for it, see Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair to Give Religion 
Special Treatment?, 2006 U. Ill. L. Rev. 571, 574. To those who worry about the definitional 
divide  between  religion  and  conscience,  for  constitutional  purposes,  religion  could  be 
defined by asking what beliefs, if imposed by the state, would amount to an establishment 
of religion. Thanks to Lucien Bebchuck for this suggestion. 
42 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 581. 
43 A common exemption sought by individuals arises when, with varying results, land-
lords resist statutes prohibiting housing discrimination on the basis of marital status. Com-
pare Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 718 (9th Cir. 1999) (grant-
ing exemption on free exercise grounds), reh’g granted and opinion withdrawn by Thomas v. 
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999), with Smith v. Fair Em-
ployment and Hous. Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909, 912 (Cal. 1996) (enforcing state prohibition 
against discrimination by landlords on the basis of marital status). 
44 J. Barrett Hyman, M.D. v. City of Louisville, 132 F. Supp. 2d 528, 532 (W.D. Ky. 2001) 
(remanding case with instructions that it be dismissed without prejudice for lack of stand-
ing), vacated, 53 F. App’x 740, 744 (2002). 2007]  Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?  9 
and unfair because they exempted religious organizations but not reli-
gious individuals.45 A federal district court rejected his claims as too 
hypothetical.46 An American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) attorney 
commented during the appeal, “Dr. Hyman has a right to believe what-
ever he wants, but he doesn’t have a right to insist that people who 
work with and for him believe it too.”47 
  The clash is even greater when it is not a religious individual but 
an entire religious group that seeks an exemption.48 Congregations, 
religious schools, and social service agencies not infrequently encoun-
ter a conflict with a civil rights law.49 The risk to governmental antidis-
crimination purposes can be sharp and pronounced.50 One goal will 
have to give way.51 Given the simultaneous civil rights commitment to 
free exercise of religion, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act allows 
religious employers, unlike other employers, to discriminate on the ba-
sis of religion in employment.52 In 1987 the Supreme Court in Corpora-
tion of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos interpreted this exemption broadly 
enough to permit a church-run gymnasium operated as a nonprofit 
facility  open  to  the  public  to  require  that  its  employees  be  church 
members in good standing.53 The Court rejected the argument that 
such an exemption violates the Establishment Clause and instead rea-
soned  that  the  exemption  allows  religious  organizations  to  advance 
their  own  purposes.54  The  Amos  decision,  however,  did  not  address 
three important issues: 1) whether the exemption is constitutionally 
                                                                                                                      
45 Id. at 536, 545. 
46 Id. at 543. 
47  An  ACLU  attorney  commented  during  the  appeal,  “We  absolutely  support  Dr. 
Hyman’s right to believe and worship however he pleases, but that does not mean he has 
the right to impose those beliefs on others in the workplace.” ACLU, Arguments Held in 
Challenge to Louisville Non-Discrimination Law (Sept. 18, 2002), http://www.aclu.org/ 
lgbt/discrim/12012prs20020918.html; see also ACLU and U.S. Dept. of Justice Ask Court to 
Dismiss Challenge to Anti-Gay Bias Law, Noting Broad Impact, ACLU News, Aug. 17, 2000, 
http://legalminds.lp.findlaw.com/list/news/msg00086.html  (Michael  Adams,  Associate 
Director of the ACLU Lesbian and Gay Rights Project, commented, “This case uses reli-
gious freedom as a smokescreen for discrimination.”). 
48 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 603. 
49 See, e.g., id. 
50 See, e.g., id. 
51 See, e.g., id. 
52 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–1(a) (2000) (“This subchapter shall not apply to an employer 
with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation, 
association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individu-
als of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corpo-
ration, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.”). 
53 483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987). 
54 Id. at 337. 10  Boston College Law Review  [Vol. 48:1 
required as an element of the free exercise of religion or is up to Con-
gress to give or take away; 2) whether an Establishment Clause problem 
would arise if the religious group receives public dollars by contract or 
voucher; and 3) the precise scope of the exemption when it conflicts 
with constitutional or statutory protections against discrimination on 
the basis of race, gender, pregnancy, or sexual orientation,55 or when 
accommodating  the  religious  group  turns  into  impermissible  estab-
lishment of religion.56 These open questions persist and spark disagree-
ments in courts and communities.  
  In 2005 in Lown v. Salvation Army, the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York dismissed claims by several private em-
ployees that the Salvation Army in, its government contract work, vio-
lated the Establishment Clause and state laws forbidding religious dis-
crimination.57  The  court  reasoned  that  the  Salvation  Army,  not  the 
government, made the employment decisions, and thus the discrimina-
tion restrictions did not apply.58 The employees had complained that 
the Salvation Army created a hostile work environment through intru-
sive inquiries about employees’ religious and sexual practices, and by 
restricting the counseling the employees could provide to adolescent 
clients at risk of HIV, sexually transmitted diseases, and pregnancy.59 
  In contrast to the Lown decision, in Teen Ranch v. Udow, a 2005 
case before the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michi-
gan,  a  faith-based  organization  protested  the  state’s  moratorium 
against further contractual relationships with it because its programs 
imposed religious beliefs in the daily treatment and service plans for 
delinquent,  neglected,  abused,  and  emotionally  troubled  youth.60 
                                                                                                                      
55 Moreover, the majority opinion did not resolve apparent tensions with prior deci-
sions  rejecting  state  actions  accommodating  religion  as  impermissible  establishment  of 
religion. See Laurence Tribe, Constitutional Law 1197 & n.57 (2d. ed. 1988). For a 
description of Establishment Clause jurisprudence and a contention as to its inconsistency, 
see Ashley M. Bell, God Save This Honorable Court: How Current Establishment Clause Jurisdic-
tion Can Be Reconciled with the Secularization of Historical Religious Expressions, 50 Am. U. L. 
Rev. 1273, 1274 (2001). 
56 See generally Rodney K. Smith, Nonpreferentialism in Establishment Clause Analysis, 65 St. 
John’s L. Rev. 245 (1991). 
57 393 F. Supp. 2d 223, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
58 Id. The court did allow the plaintiffs to pursue retaliation employment claims. Id. at 
255. 
59 Id. at 231–33. A court would have more trouble dismissing such claims if a religious 
organization  provides  employment  as  part of  its  government-funded  services,  and  uses 
religious indoctrination in that context, for then the government is implicated in the em-
ployer’s religious direction of its employees. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-
Based Initiative and the Constitution, 55 DePaul L. Rev. 1, 104 (2005). 
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Teen Ranch filed an action asserting constitutional violations of its 
rights to free exercise, free speech, due process, equal protection, and 
violation of the statutory right to free exercise of religion.61 The state 
replied that because the minors placed under state contract did not 
themselves choose the program, public financial support of the pro-
gram would violate the Establishment Clause.62 Even though a minor 
could opt out of the placement, the court concluded that public fund-
ing of such a program would not be appropriate.63 The court thus re-
jected the religious organization’s effort to be exempt from the state’s 
contracting requirement, which stated that no public funds would be 
used to provide services or programs involving any sectarian activity, 
including sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization.64 
  What does and what should happen when a religious group wants 
to discriminate not only on the basis of religion but also on the basis of 
gender,  race,  or  sexual  orientation?  Such  a  circumstance  presents  a 
head-on clash between the civil right of free religious exercise and the 
civil rights against discrimination on the basis of one’s gender, race, or 
sexual orientation. Different civil rights grounds have occasioned dis-
tinctive social and legal responses. 
                                                                                                                      
61 Id. at 830–31. 
62 Id. at 835. 
63 Id. at 836. 
64 Id. at n.3 (quoting 2003 Mich. Pub. Acts. 172 § 220, citing conditions on public ap-
propriations). Many states have state constitutional provisions forbidding the allocation of 
public funds to sectarian schools or, in some cases, any sectarian institutions. In recent 
rulings the U.S. Supreme Court has clarified that it would not violate the Establishment 
Clause for public funds to be used by sectarian institutions as long as the funding is indi-
rect and individuals retain choice about their participation; what remains an open ques-
tion  is  whether  now  these  state  constitutional  provisions  (often  called  “Blaine  Amend-
ments”) themselves run afoul of the Federal Constitution either as a constraint on free 
exercise or as a viewpoint discrimination. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, The Theology of the 
Blaine Amendments, 2 First Amendment L. Rev. 45, 49–50 (2004); Eric W. Treene, The 
Grand Finale Is Just the Beginning: School Choice and the Coming Battle over Blaine 
Amendments  3–4,  www.blaineamendments.org/scholarship/FedSocBlaineWP.html.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 28, 2007). For consideration of the doctrinal and theoretical treatments 
of this and related issues, see generally Steven K. Green, Locke v. Davey and the Limits to 
Neutrality Theory, 77 Temp. L. Rev. 913 (2004); Luke A. Lantta, The Post-Zelman Voucher Bat-
tleground: Where to Turn After Federal Challenges to Blaine Amendments Fail, 67 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 213 (2004); Joseph P. Viteritti, Davey’s Plea: Blaine, Blair, Witters, and the Protection of 
Religious Freedom, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 299 (2003); Toby Heytens, Note, School Choice 
and State Constitutions, 86 Va. L. Rev. 117 (2000). 12  Boston College Law Review  [Vol. 48:1 
A. Race 
  Historically,  religious  organizations  have  been  prohibited  from 
discriminating on the basis of race.65 In 1967 the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Loving v. Virginia rejected a law prohibiting interracial marriage, 
despite the religious rationale offered by the state and accepted by 
the trial judge who upheld a conviction under the law.66 The Court 
concluded: 
Marriage is one of the “basic civil rights of man,” fundamen-
tal  to  our very  existence  and  survival. . . . The Fourteenth 
Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry 
not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under 
our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a per-
son of another race resides with the individual and cannot 
be infringed by the State.67 
  Three years after Loving, in 1970 in Green v. Kennedy, parents of 
black school children challenged before the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia the grant of tax-exempt status to private schools in 
Mississippi that discriminated against blacks.68 The Supreme Court had 
rejected as unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause the use 
of tax grants to allow white students to attend private racially restricted 
schools when Virginia’s Prince Edward County closed its public schools 
in  resistance  to  court-ordered  desegregation.69  The  constitutional 
backdrop of the school desegregation cases—and the widespread rec-
                                                                                                                      
65 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 603. 
66 388 U.S. 1, 2–3 (1967). The Court had dodged the issue for several years before fac-
ing it. See Peter Wallenstein, Race, Marriage, and the Law of Freedom: Alabama and Virginia, 
1860s–1960s, 70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 371, 372 (1994) (examining how the Supreme Court 
dodged the merits and avoided treating the antimiscegenation issue). The key example is 
Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955), vacated and remanded, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), reinstated 
and aff’d, 90 S.E.2d 849, appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956). In Naim, the state court’s 
view explained that the Virginia law was intended, “to preserve the racial integrity of [Vir-
ginia’s] citizens,” to prevent “the corruption of blood,” “a mongrel breed of citizens,” and 
“the obliteration of racial pride.” Id. at 756. On the status of religious premises in legisla-
tion,  see  Scott  C.  Idleman,  Religious  Premises,  Legislative  Judgments,  and  the  Establishment 
Clause,  12  Cornell  J.L.  &  Pub.  Pol’y  1,  6  (2002)  (disputing arguments  that  religious 
moral premises produce constitutional defects in legislation). 
67 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). 
68 Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1129 (D. D.C. 1970). 
69  Griffin  v.  School  Bd.,  377  U.S.  218,  233  (1964).  Suspicion  that  “private  choice” 
masked evasion of desegregation became a theme throughout the 1960s and 1970s. See 
Thomas  C.  Berg,  Race  Relations  and  Modern  Church-State  Relations,  43  B.C.  L.  Rev.  1009, 
1020–23  (2002).  More  recently,  many  religious schools  actually  serve  racial  integration 
rather than undermine it. Id. at 1028–31. 2007]  Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?  13 
ognition that parents could use exclusively white private schools as an 
end-run around the Supreme Court’s 1955 decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education70—informed the challenge to the tax exemption for racially 
restrictive private schools.71 The emerging conflict between broad civil 
rights statutes and narrower interpretations by judges, school boards, 
and other local actors also influenced the treatment of the tax exemp-
tion for private schools.72 
  Initially,  the  Internal  Revenue  Service  (the  “IRS”)  indicated  it 
lacked authority to deny tax-exempt status to institutions that met the 
statutory elements (operating on a nonprofit basis, pursuing one of the 
enumerated  purposes,  and  avoiding  lobbying  and  political  cam-
paigns).73  As  the  litigation  proceeded  however,  the  IRS  changed  its 
view, but not without disagreement internal to the agency.74 Then the 
court in Green ordered the IRS to withhold tax-exempt status from Mis-
sissippi private schools that excluded students on the basis of race.75 
                                                                                                                      
70 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
71 See Green, 309 F. Supp. at 1133–34. 
72 See Jack M. Beermann, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, Fifty Years Later, 
34 Conn. L. Rev. 981, 1034–35 (2002); Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights 
Legislation, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 1323, 1357 (1952). 
73 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3); Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 577–78. 
74 See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 578; Thomas W. Merrill, High-Level, “Tenured” Lawyers, 
61 Law & Contemp. Probs. 83, 90–91 (1998). As Thomas Merrill explained: 
  When the IRS, enforcing a policy imposed on it by the courts and having 
scant textual basis, revoked the school’s tax-exempt status, the school sought 
review of the policy by the Supreme Court. The Solicitor General, Rex Lee, 
disqualified himself from participating in the case. Acting in his place was 
Lawrence  Wallace,  senior  Deputy  Solicitor  General  and  the  quintessential 
tenured civil service lawyer. 
  At the certiorari stage, Wallace argued that the IRS’s policy was correct. 
However, after review was granted and certain members of Congress criticized 
the IRS’s position, a group of political appointees in the Justice Department 
known as the “Bob Jones team” launched an effort to get the Department to 
change its position. Attorney General Smith eventually sided with this group 
and ordered Wallace to file a brief supporting the university. Wallace did so, 
but only after including a footnote describing the brief as stating the “posi-
tion of the United States” but not that of “the Acting Solicitor General.”
 Wal-
lace thus publicly signaled that the legal argument of the Administration was 
not endorsed by the tenured lawyers in the Solicitor General’s office. 
Merrill, supra, at 90–91 (footnotes omitted). 
Subsequently, the Department of Justice established the position of the “Political Dep-
uty” to handle cases when the Solicitor General—the top political appointee—is disquali-
fied. Id. at 91. 
75 309 F. Supp. at 1131 (granting preliminary injunction)); Green v. Connally, 330 F. 
Supp. 1150, 1156 (D. D.C. 1971) (approving IRS interpretation of the statute to authorize 
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Thereafter, the IRS notified all private schools that their tax-exempt 
status depended upon maintaining a policy of nondiscrimination, and 
the IRS enacted this view in Revenue Ruling 71–447.76 
  Ultimately, the Supreme Court in 1982 in Bob Jones University v. 
United States upheld the IRS ruling, and allowed the relatively low-level 
authority of a federal agency ruling to trump the free exercise of re-
ligion claimed by Bob Jones University.77 Devoted to teaching funda-
mentalist Christian religious beliefs, the university had from its found-
ing excluded African-Americans due to its view that the Bible forbade 
interracial dating and marriage.78 In 1971 the university agreed to ac-
cept blacks who were married, and married to another black person.79 
When the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 1976 pro-
hibited racial exclusion from private schools in McCrary v. Runyon,80 
Bob Jones University revised its policy and permitted the admission of 
unmarried blacks but enacted a disciplinary rule prohibiting, with the 
sanction  of  expulsion,  interracial  dating  and  marriage  by  students. 
The  university  also  threatened  expulsion  of  students  “who  espouse, 
promote, or encourage others to violate the University’s dating rules.”81 
These policy adjustments may have been motivated in part by pressure 
from a threatened loss of the tax exemption.82 
                                                                                                                      
denial of tax exemption to racially restrictive private school), summarily aff’d, Coit v. Green, 
404 U.S. 997 (1971). 
76 See Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971–2 C.B. 230. 
77 461 U.S. at 574. The Supreme Court accepted the agency’s view that a private school 
lacking a racially nondiscriminatory admission policy falls outside the definition of “char-
ity” as used in the Internal Revenue Code as the basis for tax-exempt status. See Mark T. 
Dalhousie, An Island in the Lake of Fire: Bob Jones University, Fundamentalism, 
and the Separatist Movement 158 (1996); Aaron Haberman, Into The Wilderness: Ronald 
Reagan, Bob Jones University, and the Political Education of the Christian Right, 67 Historian 
235, 235 (2005). 
78 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 582. 
79 Id. 
80 515 F.2d 1082, 1085 (1975), aff’d, 427 U.S. 160, 172 (1976). The Supreme Court also 
rejected  a  constitutional  argument  that  freedom  of  association  required  an  exemption 
from the applicable civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. McCrary, 427 U.S. at 175. The 
Court, however, explicitly refrained from deciding whether a religious school would have a 
different and better argument for an exemption. See id. at 167; Robert Cover, The Supreme 
Court 1982 Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 62 (1983). 
81 Bob Jones Univ. 461 U.S. at 580–81. 
82 Analytically, a tax exemption is a privilege, giving the recipient something more 
than others get. Yet against the backdrop of longstanding receipt of the tax exemption, 
threatened removal can operate like a threat of punishment. See Austin Cline, Religious 
Exemptions vs. Government Policy, About.com, http://atheism.about.com/od/churchestax- 
exemptions/a/govtpolicy.htm?p=1 (last visited Aug. 28, 2007). See generally Nancy Rosen-
blum, Introduction to Obligations of Citizenship and Demands of Faith (2000); Mi-
chael McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools, 104 Harv. L. 
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  The IRS notified the university that it would lose its tax-exempt 
status, as of the date it learned of the change in IRS policy.83 The uni-
versity then paid $21 as a tax on one employee, and sued for a refund— 
even as the government countersued for close to a half of million dol-
lars in unemployment taxes unpaid for the period between 1971 and 
1975.84 The U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina ruled 
that the IRS had exceeded its powers, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit reversed. 85  
  By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, Ronald Reagan 
had become president, and his administration wanted to grant the tax 
exemptions  and  moot  the  case.86  A  firestorm  of  public  reaction 
                                                                                                                      
Rev. 989 (1991). Tax-exempt status under federal law is valuable both directly to the or-
ganization and indirectly it relates to the tax deductibility of donations. 
83 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 581. 
84 Id. at 581–82. 
85 Id. at 582. 
86 See Fred Barbash, Court Bars 2 Schools’ Tax Break, Wash. Post, May 25, 1983, at A1; 
Glenn Fowler, Private Schools Groups Assail Tax Rule Shift, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1982, at 19; 
Paul Taylor, Fight Looms on Tax Break for Schools, Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 1982, at A10; Stuart 
Taylor, School Tax Issue Put to High Court in Shift by Reagan, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1982, at A1 
(reporting that the Reagan administration, reversing position, said it would argue that 
current law required granting exemptions to such schools); Stuart Taylor, School Tax Ruling 
Faces a Challenge, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1982, at 1 [hereinafter Stuart, School Tax Ruling]; Stu-
art Taylor, U.S. Drops Rule on Tax Penalty for Racial Bias, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1982, at 1; Steven 
R. Weisman, Reagan Acts to Bar Tax Break to Schools in Racial Bias Cases, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 
1982, at A1 (reporting that President Reagan modified his position and announced that 
the IRS would withhold exemptions until Congress acted). The Reagan administration 
shifted policy several times, and its motivations are disputed with some commentators ar-
guing  that  President  Reagan  wanted  to  strengthen  conservative  white  and  “Christian 
Right” support. See Dan T. Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in 
the Conservative Counterrevolution, 1963–1994, at 57 (1996); Ronnie Dugger, On 
Reagan: The Man and His Presidency 219 (1983); Wilbur Edel, The Reagan Presidency: 
An  Actor’s  Finest  Performance  88  (1992);  Kenneth  O’Reilly,  Nixon’s  Piano:  Presi-
dents and Racial Politics from Washington to Clinton 371 (1995). Others argued that 
the racial dimension of the matter was not salient and instead Reagan wanted to control 
the IRS and other agencies that might act without congressional authority. See Lawrence I. 
Barrett, Gambling with History: Ronald Reagan in the White House 419–20 (1983); 
Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime 521–23 (rev. ed. 2000); David 
Whitman, Ronald Reagan and Tax Exemptions for Racist Schools 35 (1984); Raymond 
Wolters, Right Turn: William Bradford Reynolds, the Reagan Administration, and 
Black Civil Rights 469 (1996). On the allocation of authority between and among the 
President, Congress, and administrative agencies, see generally Einer Elhauge, Statu-
tory Default Rules (forthcoming 2008); Robert Coulam & Ken Bresler, Defining Torture 
in  the  War  on  Terror  (A):  “Checking  With  Professionals,”  in  Coercive  Interrogation  Case 
Study (2006) (describing power and interplay between law and politics in the struggle 
between the executive and State Department branches of legal counsel in development of 
the 2002 “Torture Memo”); Jerry L. Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms: Agency Statutory Inter-
pretation as an Autonomous Enterprise, 55 U. Toronto L.J. 497, 506–13 (2005). 16  Boston College Law Review  [Vol. 48:1 
erupted.87 As presented to the Supreme Court, the clash between reli-
gious exercise and protection against racial discrimination concerned 
entirely the availability of favorable tax treatment.88 The Court com-
bined its treatment of the case with review of the denial of tax-exempt 
status  to  Goldsboro  Christian  School,  which  offered  kindergarten 
through high school to white students.89 The schools would have to ob-
tain an exemption from otherwise operating rules about tax treatment 
to continue operating.90 
                                                                                                                      
87 See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 86; Taylor, School Tax Ruling Faces, supra note 86. 
88 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 577. 
89 Id. at 579. Based on an interpretation of the Bible, the Goldsboro Christian School 
excluded all nonwhite students. Id. at 583. 
90 See id. at 577. On some views—especially those emerging in the Supreme Court to-
day—it is far from clear that the schools’ free exercise of religion would require such an 
exemption as a matter of constitutional law. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. The Revenue 
Ruling does not target religious schools; it is a generally applicable, neutral rule that de-
nies tax-exempt status to any educational institution discriminating on the basis of race. See 
Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971–2 C.B. 230. Denial of favorable tax treatment does not amount to 
coercion. See Cline, supra note 82(explaining that a tax exemption is a privilege, not a 
right). The Revenue Ruling is compatible with current Supreme Court doctrine about free 
exercise claims. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. In its admittedly controversial ruling in 1990 in 
Employment Division v. Smith, the Court replaced its previous careful consideration of bur-
dens on religious exercise from government action. Id. (relying on “decisions [that] have 
consistently held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obliga-
tion to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the 
law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’ United 
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)”). The 
Court reasoned that application of a valid and neutral law of general applicability did not 
warrant careful scrutiny even in the face of a claim that it burdens the free exercise of 
religion. Id. at 885–86. As a result, the Court easily approved the denial of unemployment 
benefits to individuals who lost their jobs after engaging in a religious ritual involving pe-
yote, which would violate the generally applicable ban on the use of controlled substances. 
Id. at 890 (“Because respondents’ ingestion of peyote was prohibited under Oregon law, 
and because that prohibition is constitutional, Oregon may, consistent with the Free Exer-
cise Clause, deny respondents unemployment compensation when their dismissal results 
from use of the drug.”). The Court further stated that exemptions would only be war-
ranted where sought to protect not only religious but also expressive rights in a kind of 
two-for hybrid situation. Id. at 881 (noting past exemptions that involved a combination of 
free exercise and free speech claims, or free exercise and parental rights claims). The 
Court also pursued a nondiscrimination approach, seeking to avoid carving out individual 
exceptions to otherwise general laws in ways that might even raise equal protection prob-
lems. See id. at 885–86. 
It is a subject for another day whether this approach to the free exercise clause is itself 
attractive. The topic would include Congress’s disagreement and enactment of the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act, the Supreme Court’s power-play in rejecting that Act as 
beyond the power of Congress, and the responses by individual states also seeking to re-
store generous protection for the free exercise of religion. Suffice it to say that the recent 
Supreme Court developments erect real barriers to a kind of free exercise claim mounted 
against a general neutral law. 2007]  Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?  17 
  The  Supreme Court  agreed  with  the Fourth Circuit,  and  held 
Bob Jones University liable under the IRS ruling.91 The Court rea-
soned that the tax exemption, as a privilege, had to comport with law 
and public policy; and then the Court relied on changes in American 
society even more than changes in legal doctrine.92 The opinion rea-
soned, “[T]here can no longer be any doubt that racial discrimination 
in education violates deeply and widely accepted views of elementary 
justice.”93 The Court reinforced the IRS’s denial of tax-exempt status 
with  confidence  that  the  executive  branch  had  “placed  its  support 
behind eradication of racial discrimination.”94 Indeed, by the time of 
the Supreme Court hearing, all three branches of government shared 
in the national policy against race discrimination in education.95 
  Although Justice Rehnquist objected in dissent that the majority 
had invented a public policy requirement beyond what Congress es-
tablished for tax-exempt status,96 the majority found authority in the 
process and results of historical struggle.97 The majority wrote: 
Given the stress and anguish of the history of efforts to escape 
from the shackles of the “separate but equal” doctrine of Plessy 
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), it cannot be said that educa-
tional institutions that, for whatever reasons, practice racial 
discrimination, are institutions exercising “beneficial and sta-
bilizing influences in community life,” or should be encour-
aged by having all taxpayers share in their support by way of 
special tax status.98 
  The Court did not have before it an unambiguous historical re-
cord, however.99 Disputes over the IRS denial of an exemption for Bob 
Jones University played out in the mass media.100 Congressional repre-
sentatives introduced thirteen bills to overturn the agency’s decision.101 
Still, as the Court emphasized, Congress did not step in to alter the IRS 
                                                                                                                      
91 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 585. 
92 Id. at 592. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 594. 
95 Id. at 594–95, 598. 
96 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 612–13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
97 Id. at 595 (majority opinion). 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 581–82. 
100 See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 86, at 19; Taylor, School Tax Ruling, supra note 86. 
101 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 600; Barbash, supra note 86. 18  Boston College Law Review  [Vol. 48:1 
ruling.102  Instead,  in  a  move  that  the  Court’s  majority  underscored, 
Congress  extended  the  policy  by  enacting  a  provision  denying  tax-
exempt status to social clubs providing for discrimination on the basis 
of race, color, or religion.103 
  The Court found no unconstitutional burden on the free exercise 
of religion despite the claims of Bob Jones University and Goldsboro 
Christian School because the governmental interest in eradicating ra-
cial  discrimination  was  compelling,  fundamental,  and  overriding.104 
The Court refrained, however, from ruling explicitly that the Constitu-
tion  required  denial  of  tax-exempt  status  to  racially  discriminatory 
schools.105 It left the matter to agency decision-making and limited its 
decision to the treatment of schools.106 
  Thus, an interplay between the courts and a federal administra-
tive agency produced the norm denying tax exemptions to a racially 
restrictive private school.107 In upholding the agency’s rule and its ap-
plication to Bob Jones University, the Supreme Court paid attention 
to the historical context, the views of the other branches of govern-
ment,  and  the  dominant,  though  hardly  universal,  trend  in  public 
views of what justice requires.108 
  The case in some circles became a symbol of ongoing conflict 
between conservative Christians and the government.109 During his 
2000 presidential campaign, George W. Bush tried to recover from his 
primary defeat in New Hampshire by speaking at the Bob Jones Uni-
versity and allying himself with evangelical Christianity and political 
conservatism.110 When media exposed that the university still had in 
place its policy banning interracial dating, critics attacked Bush for 
condoning the institution and its policy.111 A month into the media 
blitz, the university announced an end to its policy, and Bush later 
                                                                                                                      
102 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 600. 
103 Id. at 601 (citing I.R.C. § 501(i) (2000)). 
104 See id. at 604. 
105 Id. at 599 n.24. At issue would have been the Fifth Amendment, which governs ac-
tion by the federal government. Id. The Court reasoned that it did not need to reach this 
question in light of its conclusion that the IRS Revenue Ruling comported with its author-
izing statute. Id. 
106 See id. at 604 n.29. 
107 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 605. 
108 Id. (citing I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)). 
109 See, e.g., Derrick Jackson, At Bob Jones U., a Disturbing Lesson About the Real George W., 
Boston Globe, Feb. 9, 2000, at A23. 
110 See id. 
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said  he  was  wrong  not  to  denounce  the  policy.112  Since  then,  Bob 
Jones University has begun to recruit minority students in an effort to 
improve its image.113 
  In the past few years, support for Bob Jones University at the time 
of the Supreme Court litigation has come to be viewed as a political 
liability.114 When Senator Trent Lott came under criticism for remarks 
honoring prosegregationist Strom Thurmond, critics pointed to Lott’s 
amicus brief in support of Bob Jones University’s tax exemption, espe-
cially its sentence, “race discrimination does not always violate public 
policy.”115 The issue also came up during the fall 2005 confirmation 
hearings of Chief Justice John Roberts.116 Although he indicated he was 
                                                                                                                      
112 Bob Jones University Ends Ban on Interracial Dating, CNN.com, Mar., 4, 2000, http:// 
archives.cnn.com/2000/US/03/04/bob.jones (“‘[A]s of today, we have dropped the rule,’ 
Bob Jones III said on CNN’s ‘Larry King Live.’ He said he met with administrators earlier 
in the day and decided to end the policy, because ‘[he didn’t] want to hurt the church of 
Jesus Christ.’ Besides, Jones said, the policy ‘is meaningless to us. Our concern for the 
school’s broader usefulness is greater to us than a rule we never talk about,’ he said. At 
another point, Jones said, ‘We can’t back it up with a verse in the Bible.’”) On Mr. Bush’s 
later comments, see Bush Transition Office Releases Ashcroft’s Remarks at Bob Jones University, 
CNN.com,  Jan.  12,  2001,  http://archives.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/stories/01/12/ 
ashcroft.bobjones/ (“President-elect George W. Bush came under fire when he made an 
appearance at the school during last year’s presidential primary season, and later said he 
was wrong not to denounce the institution’s policies banning inter-racial dating.”). 
113 Paul Nussbaum, Fundamentalist Bob Jones U. Loosens Up, but Just a Little Bit, Phila. 
Inquirer, July 25, 2005, at A6. 
114 John Solomon, Lott Aided Bob Jones U., Daily Iowan, Dec. 12, 2002, http://www.daily- 
iowan.com/media/storage/paper599/news/2002/12/12/Nation/Lott-Aided.Bob.Jones.U- 
341317.shtml?norewrite200604291146&sourcedomain=www.dailyiowan.com. 
115 See id. 
116 During the confirmation hearings for Chief Justice John Roberts, Senator Durbin 
asked about his view of the Reagan administration’s handling of the IRS treatment of Bob 
Jones University: 
Senator DURBIN: But there was one case, one case in particular that hasn’t 
been mentioned today that I’d like to ask you about, and that was the case in-
volving Bob Jones University. That was one of the most troubling decisions of 
the Reagan administration. It was a decision to argue before the Supreme 
Court that Bob Jones University should keep its tax-exempt status with the 
IRS, even though it had an official policy that banned interracial dating, de-
nied admission to any applicants who engaged in interracial marriage or were 
known to advocate interracial marriage or dating. 
  When the Reagan administration took that position, it reversed the posi-
tion  of  three  previous  administrations,  including  two  Republicans,  all  of 
whom argued that Bob Jones was not eligible for this tax-exempt status. This 
sudden reversal by the Reagan Justice Department, which you were part of at 
the time, led to the unusual step of the Supreme Court appointing a special 
counsel, William Coleman, as a friend of the court, to argue in support of the 
IRS. In 1983, the Supreme Court ruled 8–1 against the Reagan administration 
and against Bob Jones University. 
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not involved in the case, he was pressed for his view.117 He notably did 
not opt for the nominee life raft; in other words, he did not decline to 
answer  on  the  ground  that  the  question  might  come  before  the 
Court.118 Instead, he unequivocally answered that he disagreed with the 
Reagan  administration’s  effort  to  grant  the  tax  exemption.119  Tax-
exempt status does not go to an institution that discriminates on the 
basis of race; the matter is closed. 
  What closed the matter? Decades of political and legal debate, the 
civil rights movement’s success in public opinion and in the courts, the 
national disgust at the use of force against children, the shutting of 
public schools and recreation facilities rather than compliance, the ac-
commodation of whites over time to the dismantling of official segrega-
tion,  and  perhaps  the  option  of  “white  flight”  to  suburban  schools 
made  racial  discrimination  even  in  private  educational  settings  no 
                                                                                                                      
  Judge Roberts, there was a heated debate within the Justice Department 
about whether or not to defend Bob Jones University and its racist policies. 
More than 200 lawyers and employees of the Civil Rights Division, represent-
ing half of all the employees in that division, signed a letter of protest. Wil-
liam Bradford Reynolds, the head of the Civil Rights Division, strongly sup-
ported  defending  Bob  Jones.  Ted  Olsen—another  person  well  known  in 
Washington—opposed this defense of Bob Jones. 
  Which side were you on? What role did you play in the decision to defend 
Bob Jones University policy? 
Judge ROBERTS: Senator, I was ethically barred from taking a position on 
that case. I was just coming off of my clerkship on the Supreme Court, which 
ended in the summer of 1981. Supreme Court rules said that you could not 
participate in any way in a matter before the Supreme Court for a certain pe-
riod of time. I think it was two years or whatever it was. And it was within that 
period. This involved an issue before the Supreme Court. So I was ethically 
barred from participating in that in any way. 
  . . . . 
  . . .[DURBIN:] What is your belief? Was the Reagan administration posi-
tion on Bob Jones University the right position to take? 
ROBERTS: No, Senator. In retrospect, I think it’s clear the people who were 
involved in it, as you say, themselves think that it was an incorrect position. I 
certainly don’t disagree with that. 
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United 
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 275–76 (2005) [hereinafter 
Roberts Hearings]. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. The matter may not be entirely closed, however, as President Bush nominated 
Michael Wallace, who was an aid to Trent Lott and worked for the tax exemptions for Bob 
Jones  University  despite  its  racial  policies;  the  American  Bar  Association  rated  Wallace 
unqualified, but the White House indicated plans to go ahead with the nominee. Judicial 
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longer socially acceptable.120 A private school will not be shut down or 
criminally prosecuted, but nor will it receive the support of the com-
munity  granted  by  favorable  tax  status  to  other  educational  institu-
tions.121 Two Republican administrations in Washington, and the Re-
publican-appointed  Chief  Justice  John  Roberts  of  the  U.S.  Supreme 
Court acknowledged and acceded to the dominant national rejection 
of racial discrimination by religious educational institutions.122 
B. Gender 
  The  courts’  treatment  of  gender-based  discrimination  by  reli-
gious organizations has been mixed.123 One gutsy plaintiff has mod-
eled a gender discrimination suit on the Bob Jones University case in 
Rockwell v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston, decided by the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of New Hampshire in 2002.124 Susan Rock-
well represented herself when she sought to lift bans on gender dis-
crimination over the free exercise of religion.125 She challenged the 
tax exemption accorded to the Catholic Church on the grounds that 
the church excludes women from clergy positions.126 The court dis-
missed the suit because it was far from clear that even if she prevailed 
on her theory, the resolution would give the plaintiff the relief she 
wanted: ordination as a priest.127 Moreover, the court dismissed the 
claim as contrary to widely accepted legal doctrine known as the min-
isterial exception to the antidiscrimination laws.128 
  The federal courts have uniformly found that antidiscrimination 
laws simply do not extend to the relationships between an organized 
religious group and its clergy or anyone functioning as a minister.129 
                                                                                                                      
120 See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 595, 604. 
121 See id. at 605. 
122 See Roberts Hearings, supra note 116, at 275–76.  
123 See, e.g., Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 945 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that a teacher’s 
claim against a Catholic school for violation of Title VII’s prohibition against religious 
discrimination when the school failed to renew her contract because of her remarriage was 
without merit); Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 802, 807 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (de-
nying summary judgment to a Christian school that fired a librarian who got pregnant out 
of wedlock and holding that such firing was per se sex discrimination). 
124 See No. 02-239-M, 2002 WL 31432673, at *1 (D. N.H. Oct. 30, 2002). 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at *3.  
129 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 457 
(D.C. Cir. 1996); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 361–62 
(8th Cir. 1991); Natal v. Christian and Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1577 (1st Cir. 
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This leaves the matter to debates internal to religious groups. Such 
debates have produced change within some religious denominations, 
which now open clergy positions to women.130 Groups within other 
denominations continue to press the issue as a matter of internal re-
form, off limits to the government and outsiders.131 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 1985 in Rayburn v. General Conference 
of Seventh-Day Adventists put the matter succinctly: “[I]ntroduction of 
government standards as to the selection of spiritual leaders would 
significantly,  and  perniciously,  rearrange  the  relationship  between 
church and state.”132 
  No such clarity exists over the judicial role in reviewing exclusion 
of women by religious organizations from nonclergy roles.133 Serious 
controversies surround treatment of pregnancy in the context of em-
ployment  by  religious  groups.134  The  Supreme  Court  itself  has  had 
trouble seeing discrimination on the basis of pregnancy as itself an in-
                                                                                                                      
1989); Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1170 (4th Cir. 
1985); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560–61 (5th Cir. 1972). 
130 See Diego Ribadeneira, Still Facing Resistance, Women Ministers Expand Clergy’s Role, 
Boston Globe, Feb. 7, 1998, at B2. 
131 See generally Barbara Ferguson, Woman Imam Raises Mixed Emotions, Arab News, Mar. 
20, 2005, available at http://www.arabnews.com/?page=4&section=0&article=60721&d=20& 
m=3&y=2005; Avi Hein, A History of Women’s Ordination as Rabbis, http://www.jewishvirtualli- 
brary.org/jsource/Judaism/femalerabbi.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2007); Sayf ul Islam, Women 
Imam  Leading  Men  and  Women  in  Salat,  IslamiCity,  Mar.  20,  2005,  http://islamicity. 
com/articles/printarticles.asp?ref=IC0503-2646&p=1;  Women  Priests,  The  Ordination  of 
Women in the Roman Catholic Church, http://www.womenpriests.org/default.asp (last vis-
ited Aug. 6, 2007). But see Joanne Bogle, Women Priests—No Chance, This Rock, Oct. 1997, at 
18–21,  available  at  http://www.catholiceducation.org/articles/apologetics/ap0001.html; 
Ingrid  Mattson,  Can  a  Woman  Be  an  Imam?  Debating  Form  and  Function  in  Muslim 
Women’s  Leadership,  http://macdonald.hartsem.edu/muslimwomensleadership.pdf  (last 
visited Sept. 10, 2007). 
132 772 F.2d 1164, 1169. The issue might have a very different valence in a nation with 
a state religion or a nation that creates a position for heads of various religions. Queen 
Elizabeth II traditionally opens the Anglican Synod session, the forum in which the church 
began  considering  the  ordination  of  women  Bishops  in  2005.  See  Alan  Cowell,  English 
Church Advances Bid for Women as Bishops, N.Y. Times, July 12, 2005, at A3; Queen Elizabeth 
Joins in Abbey Eucharist and Inauguration of New Synod, Anglican Communion News Ser-
vice, Nov. 15, 2005, http://www.anglicancommunion.org/acns/articles/40/50/acns4074. 
cfm. Yet in this country, the idea that the secular government would mix so directly into 
matters of religious doctrine and practice fairly well exemplifies precisely what our Consti-
tution seems to prohibit. See Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169. 
133 See, e.g., Vigars, 805 F. Supp. at 808. 
134 See, e.g., Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925, 951–52 (D. Neb. 1986) 
(holding that an employment rule that requires termination of employees who get preg-
nant out of wedlock is not a violation of Title VII); see also Vigars, 805 F. Supp. at 805–08. 2007]  Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?  23 
stance of sex discrimination.135 In 1974, the Court—then composed of 
all-male justices—reasoned in Geduldig v. Aiello that the two classes of 
pregnant and nonpregnant persons do not perfectly track gender, as 
there can be nonpregnant women as well as nonpregnant men.136 In 
response, Congress promptly amended Title VII to include pregnancy-
based  discrimination  as  a  forbidden  ground;  henceforth,  employers 
cannot lawfully discriminate on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or 
related medical conditions.137 But the statutory amendment could nei-
ther alter the constitutional interpretation, nor resolve potential ten-
sions between gender and pregnancy antidiscrimination law and the 
exemption for religious employers who use religion in employment.138 
  When an unmarried female employee of a religious organization 
becomes pregnant, a religious employer may seek to terminate the em-
ployment relationship because the individual engaged in nonmarital 
sexual relations contrary to religious teachings or, in a related ration-
ale, because the individual is no longer an adequate role model.139 In 
one case, a religious organization demoted a pregnant employee who 
had no student contact—she was the director of an after school pro-
gram. The organization settled the ensuing discrimination lawsuit.140 In 
another case, a teacher at a Catholic school lost her job after she be-
came pregnant and indicated she did not plan to marry the father.141 
The matter became one of contract terms, as the teacher had signed a 
contract accepting the rule in the school’s personnel handbook stating 
that “a teacher is required to convey the teachings of the Catholic faith 
                                                                                                                      
135 See Gen. Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 127–28 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 
484, 494 (1974). 
136 417 U.S. at 496–97. 
137 Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)(2000). 
138 Thomas C. Berg, The Constitutional Future of Religious Freedom Legislation, 20 U. Ark. 
Little Rock L. Rev. 715, 742 (1998). 
139 See, e.g., Chambers, 629 F. Supp. at 929. 
140 The New York Civil Liberties Union (the “NYCLU”) sued in 2003 on behalf of the 
director of an after-school program employed by a religious charity. When the unmarried 
program director became pregnant, the charity demoted her to a position that involved no 
student contact. The NYCLU’s Reproductive Rights Project filed an Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) complaint against the charity alleging sex and preg-
nancy discrimination. The EEOC found that the religious charity violated federal anti-
discrimination laws by demoting the teacher because of her pregnancy. The NYCLU se-
cured a favorable settlement that included the adoption by the charity of an employment 
policy that prohibits discrimination on the basis of marital status or pregnancy. Lenora M. 
Lapidus et al., ACLU Women’s Rights Project Annual Report 4 (2002), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/wrpreport%202002.pdf. 
141 John Leo, The Case of Michelle McCusker, Townhall.com, Dec. 5, 2005, http://www. 
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by his or her words and actions, demonstrating an acceptance of Gos-
pel values and the Christian tradition.”142 
  An individual may sign an enforceable employment agreement 
that waives her antidiscrimination rights, if that waiver is not itself co-
erced or unconscionable,143 but postdispute settlements are more ac-
ceptable than a predispute waiver. A court could accept a defense to a 
discrimination claim that compliance with the Christian tradition is a 
bona fide occupational requirement.144 One court accepted this ar-
gument from a nonreligious employer; the Omaha Girls’ Club suc-
cessfully defended against a discrimination claim brought by an un-
married counselor on the theory that she was supposed to provide a 
role model to adolescent girls.145 
  Yet the exemption allowing religious employers to discriminate 
on the basis of religion does not clearly permit discrimination on the 
basis of gender or pregnancy.146 After all, under Title VII, a religious 
employer is permitted to use religion as a basis for hiring, firing, and 
promotion decisions, but Title VII has been amended by the Preg-
nancy Disability Act to prohibit covered employers from discriminat-
ing on the basis of pregnancy.147 An employer’s actions based on relig-
iously  inspired  ideas  about  race,  sex,  and  pregnancy  do  not  more 
obviously fall within the religion exemption than they trigger the pro-
tections against race, sex, and pregnancy discrimination.148 
                                                                                                                      
142 See id. 
143 See, e.g., Johnson v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1447, 1454 (D. Minn. 1996). 
For commentary on waivers, often requiring arbitration of employer-employee disputes 
over a statutory antidiscrimination remedy, see Michael D. Karpeles, Mandatory Arbitration 
in the Workplace, Aug. 12, 2002, http://www.goldbergkohn.com/news-publications-29.html. 
See generally Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 
(2002). In enforceable arbitration agreements, courts permit predispute waiver of rights to 
sue, see, e.g., Safrit v. Cone Mills Corp., 248 F.3d 306, 307 (4th Cir. 2001), but waiver of the 
substantive right itself raises more serious issues of enforceability. See Cass R. Sunstein, 
Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 106, 108 (2002). 
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145 Chambers, 629 F. Supp. at 943, 951–52; see Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis. 
L. Rev. 539, 550; see also Lena Williams, Omaha Asks if an Unwed Mother Can Be a Fit Role 
Model for Teenagers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1986, at 18. Even though it prevailed, Girls, Inc., 
the new name for the Omaha Girls Club, no longer fires or refuses to hire unmarried 
pregnant women, apparently due to the costs and publicity surrounding the case. Inter-
view by Rachel Galper with Girls, Inc. staff (Apr. 2006) (notes on file with author). 
146 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). 
147 See id. at § 2000e(k). 
148 See id. at § 2000e(k), § 2000e-1(a). 2007]  Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?  25 
  The federal courts have given conflicting signals about whether 
to treat pregnancy-based employment decisions by religious employ-
ers as religious freedom or prohibited discrimination.149 Indeed, the 
very  same  court  has  issued  decisions  pointing  in  opposite  direc-
tions.150 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 1991 ruled 
in Little v. Wuerl that a Catholic school could refuse to renew the con-
tract of a non-Catholic teacher whose divorce and remarriage did not 
conform to Catholic norms.151 The Court reasoned that “the permis-
sion to employ persons ‘of a particular religion’ includes permission 
to employ only persons whose beliefs and conduct are consistent with 
the employer’s religious precepts.”152 Yet two years later, in 1993, an-
other panel of the same court ruled in Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed 
Virgin Mary Parish School that the religion exemption did not provide a 
shield against a discrimination claim by a teacher who was fired by a 
Catholic school for marrying a divorced man.153 
  Other courts have suggested that a gender neutral policy, such as 
a policy against premarital sex by an employee, if applied in a gender 
neutral way, avoids potential clashes between a religious employer's 
religious views and the  obligation to avoid sex discrimination. The 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in 1992 in 
Vigars v. Valley Christian Center denied a summary judgment motion 
and called for a trial to determine whether the religious school fired 
the librarian because she was pregnant out of wedlock or instead be-
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(3d Cir. 1993), with Little, 929 F.2d at 951. 
151 929 F.2d at 951. 
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cause she had an adulterous affair.154 The court reasoned that child-
birth out of wedlock would be an impermissible reason but adultery 
would  be  a  ground  that  the  Christian  school  could  use  to  ensure 
compliance with a Christian lifestyle.155 Both characterizations, how-
ever, would seem to violate a Christian life style. Yet, the Michigan 
Court of Appeals concluded in 1987 that “the state’s interest in eradi-
cating employment discrimination renders the burden upon a defen-
dant’s free exercise of religion a constitutionally permissible one” in 
McLeod v. Providence Christian School, a case where the applicant was 
denied employment because she had school-aged children.156 
  The only time the U.S. Supreme Court has faced the question it 
dodged it.157 In Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, 
decided by the Supreme Court in 1985, the pregnant teacher, Linda 
Hoskinson, was married.158 When she became pregnant, the Dayton 
Christian Schools decided not to renew her teaching contract.159 The 
schools’  sponsoring  churches  adhered  to  the  view  that  a  mother  of 
young children should not work outside the home.160 Hoskinson hired 
a lawyer who informed the school that it was violating federal and state 
antidiscrimination law.161 The school then fired Hoskinson for violating 
its practice of Biblical Chain of Command, a belief that all disputes in-
volving  members  of  the  church  should  be  resolved  within  the 
church.162 Next, Hoskinson filed a sex discrimination complaint with 
the Ohio Civil Rights Commission.163 The Commission proposed a set-
tlement in which the school would clarify in its employment contracts 
that employees may contact the Commission if they believe they are 
being discriminated against.164 The school then filed its own lawsuit in 
federal court, arguing that its free exercise of religion prohibited the 
Commission from investigating discrimination claims at the school.165 
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  The school lost in the district court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit reversed, and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed.166 
The  Supreme  Court  concluded  that  the  federal  courts  should  not 
have interfered in ongoing state proceedings.167 Ultimately, Hoskin-
son dropped her state action.168 In the meantime, she had three chil-
dren and did not return to teaching.169 But she remained unrecon-
ciled to the school’s decision.170 She commented, “If a person who is 
in a religious institution cannot have the protection of the law, then I 
think we’re in for some serious problems, because if they don’t have 
the protection of the law, there’s going to be a vacuum there they’re 
just sucked into.”171 
  By working for a religious organization, does an individual re-
move herself from the protections of the civil rights laws? The Dayton 
Christian Schools remained adamant that their conflicts are their own 
to resolve, and that by working for the schools, Hoskinson agreed to 
follow the religious precepts adhered to by the schools both in sub-
stance  and  method  for  addressing  disputes.172  The  Supreme  Court 
ducked the hard question by relying on the procedural move, letting 
the state process resolve itself before a federal judgment.173 The Court 
looked for and found a way to avoid taking sides in the contest be-
tween religious freedom and gender equality by relying on the divi-
sion between federal and state authority.174 As a result, the relation-
ship between free exercise of religion and gender discrimination— 
and the precise scope of the religious exemption to Title VII’s ban on 
gender discrimination in private employment—remain unsettled in 
federal law.175 
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C. Sexual Orientation 
  Courts have generally sided with religious organizations on claims 
of discrimination based on sexual orientation.176 In Gay Rights Coalition 
of Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown University, decided by the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals in 1987, two gay student groups 
won, as a statutory matter, their challenge under the local human rights 
code to Georgetown University’s refusal to grant them recognition and 
access  to  the  kind  of  resources  given  to  other  recognized  student 
groups.177 But Congress, having authority over the District of Columbia, 
responded by amending the human rights code.178 Judicially, antidis-
crimination norms began to trump claims by religious groups—but po-
litically, the religious exemption won.179 
  Although claims of discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion have not generated victories for plaintiffs suing religious organi-
zations, neither have they done much to clarify the law.180 In Pedreira v. 
Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children, decided by the U.S. District Court 
for the Western District of Kentucky in 2001, a Baptist social service 
agency in Kentucky, the state’s largest provider of services for trou-
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178 See Nation’s Capital Religious Liberty and Academic Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 101–
168, 103 Stat. 1284. 
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bled youth, fired a therapist who was a lesbian.181 Alice Pedreira dis-
closed her sexual orientation during the hiring interview, and the di-
rector said that there was no policy against hiring gays or lesbians but 
that she should be discreet.182 A photograph taken before she took 
the job showed up at an amateur photo display at the state fair. It 
showed Alice  wearing  a  t-shirt  reading  “Isle of Lesbos”  and  posing 
with her partner.183 The agency asked for her resignation.184 She de-
clined.185 She was fired, and then she sued.186 She argued that because 
the agency received much of its revenues from government contracts, 
the government was illegally funding religiously based employment 
policies.187 The agency indicated it would refuse further government 
contracts  rather  than  alter  its  policies.188  The  judge  sided  with  the 
Kentucky Baptist Homes and reasoned that the agency was allowed to 
ensure that the conduct of its employees remained consistent with its 
Christian mission.189 One commentator observed that the case raised 
the question of how broadly to define an organization’s religious ten-
ets: “[W]as Pedreira’s firing a discriminatory dismissal based upon her 
                                                                                                                      
181 Id. at 759. 
182  Interview  by  People  for  the  American  Way  with  Alice  Pedreira,  http://www. 
insideout.org/documentaries/faith/pop/pedreira.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2007).  
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Pedreira, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 759. 
187 See id. at 763. 
188 Mary Leonard, Judge Sees No Bias in Firing of Lesbian, Ky. Baptist Agency Favored in Rul-
ing, Boston Globe, July 5, 2001, at A2. As a result of Pedreira’s suit, Kentucky Baptist 
Homes, which operates eight residential centers for nearly 800 youngsters, threatened to 
not renew its contract if the state attempted to impose antibias rules as a condition for 
funding. Id. “If there was ever a time when we had to choose between our standards for 
role models for children and public dollars, we will stick by our values,” declared a spokes-
person. Id. Governor Paul Patton announced that the state would not penalize Baptist 
Homes  for  refusing  to  employ homosexuals,  even though  eighty  percent  of  its  budget 
came from public funds. Am. Atheists, District Judge: Baptist Firing of Lesbian Upheld, 
July 27, 2001, http://www.atheists.org/flash.line/faith31.htm. In July 2000 Kentucky Bap-
tist Homes for Children won its stand-off with critics, and the group’s executive committee 
voted 5–0 to renew the contract. Id. Baptist Homes President Bill Smithwick told The Cou-
rier-Journal newspaper that the agency “will continue its current hiring practices and em-
phasis on traditional family values.” Id. The agency was honored by the state Baptist or-
ganization for standing by its principles. See David Winfrey & Trennis Henderson, Kentucky 
Baptists Establish Committee to Examine Baptist Faith and Message, Baptist2Baptist, Nov. 27, 
2000, http://www.baptist2baptist.net/printfriendly.asp?ID=161. 
189 See Pedreira, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 761. 30  Boston College Law Review  [Vol. 48:1 
sexual orientation or was it due to her being unable to uphold the 
religious mission or principles of her employer?”190 
  Similar cases have settled without clarifying the law.191 The Salva-
tion Army, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York, and Agudath 
Israel, an Orthodox Jewish organization, have successfully challenged a 
New York City executive order requiring organizations receiving city 
funds not to discriminate on the basis of “sexual orientation and affec-
tional preference.”192 The New York Court of Appeals in Under 21 v. City 
of New York in 1985 reasoned that the order exceeded the mayor’s au-
thority.193 In 1986 the New York City Council responded by leaving to 
religious organizations the power to make hiring decisions consistent 
with their own principles.194 
  When President George W. Bush promoted legislation for faith-
based initiatives that would fund religious groups to provide social 
services, prison programs, and other activities, a major source of po-
litical  opposition  arose  over  proposed  exemptions  from  civil  rights 
laws, including local and state civil rights laws banning sexual orienta-
tion discrimination.195 Media reports that the Salvation Army and the 
White House negotiated over shielding the organization from ordi-
nances prohibiting discrimination against gays and lesbians were par-
ticularly explosive.196 Opinion polls showed little public knowledge of 
the issue across the country.197 But civil rights organizations mobilized 
against the entire initiative and contributed to its stall in Congress.198 
  Civil  rights  groups  have  focused  on  the  narrow  question  of 
whether religious organizations can use religion as a basis for employ-
                                                                                                                      
190  Amy  E.  Black  et  al.,  Of  Little  Faith:  The  Politics  of  George  W.  Bush’s 
Faith-Based Initiatives 258 (2004). 
191 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Settlement of the Belmore Litigation, (on file with 
the Boston College Law Review), available at http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/lawreviews/ 
bclawreview/Past_Issues.html (discussing the settlement of a case brought by a fired les-
bian employee and a Jewish applicant, both of whom were denied jobs on the basis that 
religious organizations providing publicly funded child welfare social services in Georgia 
must do so without infringing on the rights of employees, taxpayers, recipients of services, 
or religious groups). 
192 See Charles Glenn, The Ambiguous Embrace 194–95 (2000). 
193 482 N.E.2d 1, 2 (N.Y. 1985); Glenn, supra note 192, at 195. 
194 Glenn, supra note 192, at 195. 
195 See Black et al., supra note 190, at 208; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 59, at 9–11. 
Other criticisms concerned the funding of religious groups and the blurring separation of 
church and state, fears of waste and fraud, and fears of diverting funds from existing pro-
grams. Black et al., supra note 190, at 208–09. 
196 Black et al., supra note 190, at 211. 
197 Id. at 212. 
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ment decisions without even touching on potential intersections with 
racial, gender, pregnancy, or sexuality issues.199 They claimed that this 
religious exemption for private employers under Title VII would take 
on a new meaning when the private employers received public fund-
ing.200 Public funding provided a very specific ground for opposing the 
President’s faith-based initiatives.201 The critics objected to what they 
called “government-sponsored discrimination.”202 Proponents, in con-
trast, valorized precisely the religious character of the programs as cru-
cial  to  improving  the  success  rate  of  government-funded  social  ser-
vices.203 The Republicans backed off and the President’s initiative was 
                                                                                                                      
199 See, e.g., Pedreira, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 763. 
200 See Leonard, supra note 188. Answering as a legal matter whether the religious ex-
emption  that  is  permissible  for  the  private  religious  employer  is  no  longer  acceptable 
when that employer receives public funding requires predicting how the Supreme Court 
will articulate and apply emerging doctrines of the Establishment Clause and state action. 
Does the fact of the public funding turn the behavior into publicly financed discrimina-
tion? The most recent judicial word on this subject is from the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, which dismissed the employee claims against the Salvation 
Army in New York on the grounds that it was the Salvation Army, not the government, that 
made the employment decisions, and thus there was no state action to trigger the relevant 
legal prohibitions. Lown v. Salvation Army, 393 F. Supp. 2d 223, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Here, 
the notoriously ambiguous question of state action comes into play, and the escalating use 
of private contracts by governments to perform previously public tasks raises the stakes. 
See, e.g., id. at 228. In addition, the rapidly shifting Establishment Clause jurisprudence— 
permitting, for example, funding of school vouchers used in parochial schools, and reject-
ing the exclusion of religious groups from generally available programs—means that pub-
lic dollars can be and are used to support many more religious programs than in the past. 
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 645 (2002). This invites the question about 
publicly funded discrimination on the basis of religion. See id. at 645. For Zelman v. Simon-
Harris commentary, see Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000) (taxpayers bring law-
suit against private Catholic secondary schools receiving government funding); Rosenber-
ger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845 (1995) (public university withholding funds from 
student Christian magazine); supra note 64. But I predict that the shifting constitutional 
context  makes  exemptions  more  likely  for  publicly-funded  religious  groups  as  well.  See 
Martha Minow, Choice or Commonality: Welfare and Schooling After the End of Welfare As We 
Knew It, 49 Duke L.J. 493, 540–41 (1999). 
201 Black et al., supra note 190, at 208. 
202 Id. at 209. 
203 See, e.g., 101 Cong. Rec. H4259(daily ed. July 19, 2001) (statement of Rep. Paul). 
Rep. Paul stated: 
Mr. Speaker, no one familiar with the history of the past century can doubt 
that private charities, particularly those maintained by persons motivated by 
their faith to perform charitable acts, are more effective in addressing social 
needs than federal programs. Therefore, the sponsors of HR 7, the Commu-
nity Solutions Act, are correct to believe that expanding the role of voluntary, 
religious-based organizations will benefit society. However, this noble goal will 
not be accomplished by providing federal taxpayer funds to these organiza-
tions.  Instead,  federal  funding  will  transform  these  organizations  into  ad-
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derailed, even though the national response to September 11 seemed 
to stimulate new support for mobilizing and reinforcing the volunteer 
sector.204 Congress turned to grants and tax incentives for donations to 
religious and other charities in June 2001.205 A compromise engineered 
by Senators Rick Santorum and Joe Lieberman authorized more indi-
rect  support  to  religious  groups  through  tax  breaks,  subsidies,  and 
technical  assistance  to  religious  and  other  charities,206  and  thereby 
                                                                                                                      
juncts of the federal government and reduce voluntary giving on the part of 
the people. In so doing, HR 7 will transform the majority of private charities 
into carbon copies of failed federal welfare programs. 
Id. 
This is the view of President George W. Bush: 
The role of government is limited, because government cannot put hope in 
people’s hearts, or a sense of purpose in people’s lives. That happens when 
someone puts an arm around a neighbor and says, God loves you, I love you, 
and you can count on us both. (Applause.) 
  And it is that spirit which defines some of the most effective social pro-
grams in America. It is that spirit of love and compassion which makes heal-
ing lives work. Yet, for too long, some in government thought there was no 
room for faith-based groups to provide social services. I have a different point 
of view. I believe government should welcome faith-based groups as allies in 
the great work of renewing America. (Applause.) 
  I welcome faith. I welcome faith to help solve the nation’s deepest prob-
lems. I understand there’s a—that government must not and will not endorse 
a religious creed, or directly fund religious worship. That’s obviously not a 
role of government, and that’s not what we’re talking about here. 
  But governments can and should support effective social services provided 
by religious people, so long as they work and as long as those services go to 
anyone in need, regardless of their faith. And when government gives that 
support,  it  is  equally  important  that  faith-based  institutions should  not  be 
forced  to  change  the  [sic]  character  or  compromise  their  prophetic  role. 
(Applause.)  
39 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 181 (Feb. 10, 2003). See generally Laura B. Mutterperl, Note, 
Employment  at  (God’s)  Will:  The  Constitutionality  of  Antidiscrimination  Exemptions  in  Charitable 
Choice Legislation, 37 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 389 (2002), Vikram Amar & Alan Brownstein, 
The “Charitable Choice” Bill That Was Recently Passed by the House, and the Issues It Raises, Find-
Law, Apr. 29, 2005, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20050527_brownstein.html. 
204 See Black et al., supra note 190, at 216; Alan Cooperman & Jim VandeHei, Ex-Aide 
Questions Bush Vow to Back Faith-Based Efforts, Wash. Post, Feb. 15, 2005, at A01. 
205 See Cooperman & VandeHei, supra note 204 (quoting David Kuo, former deputy in 
the White House Office of Faith Based and Community Initiatives) (“[T]he promised tax 
incentives were stripped at the last minute from the $1.6 trillion tax cut legislation ‘to 
make room for the estate-tax repeal that overwhelmingly benefited the wealthy,’ Kuo said. 
The Compassion Capital Fund has received a cumulative total of $100 million in the past 
four years, and new programs for children of prisoners, at-risk youth and prisoners reen-
tering society have received a little more than $500 million over four years, he said.”). 
206 Black et al., supra note 190, at 147–48. The Charity Aid, Recovery, and Empow-
erment (“CARE”) Act of 2003 passed both houses in 2003 but the President and congres-
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avoided granting explicit exemptions from antidiscrimination law for 
publicly funded religious providers. 
  President Bush did not give up, however, and issued executive 
orders to pursue his faith-based initiatives to change regulations and 
relations between the government and religious groups.207 In Decem-
ber 2002 President Bush issued an executive order emphasizing the 
right  of  equal  participation  by  faith-based  organizations  in  govern-
ment-funded social service programs and the right of those organiza-
tions to preserve their own religious character.208 To preserve that re-
ligious  character,  according  to  the  order,  religious  employers  are 
permitted  to  select  employees  who  share  their  own  religious  mis-
sion.209 The White House expressly limited its policy permitting reli-
gious preference for religious employers “to the extent permitted by 
law,”210 but the law is shifting, especially with the increasing presence 
of President Bush's judicial appointees on the bench. 
  Local norms against sexual orientation discrimination are likely 
to give way to religious exemption. By 2003, the New York State Hu-
man Rights Law extended protection against discrimination in em-
ployment,  housing,  education,  and  other  public  accommodations 
based on sexual orientation—but included an exemption for religious 
organizations, which may limit employment, sale or rent of any hous-
ing accommodation, or admission to a religious denomination based 
on sexual orientation if by taking such action, they intend to promote 
their religious principles.211 
                                                                                                                      
sional leadership switched to tax incentives rather than a direct funding program. See id. at 
263. As passed by both houses, the 2003 bill would have ensured religious freedom for 
participating organizations but not exemptions from otherwise prevailing laws. See The 
Charity Aid, Recovery, and Empowerment (“CARE”) Act of 2003, Title III: Equal Treat-
ment  for  Non-Governmental  Providers,  S.  476,  108th  Cong.  (2003)  (“This  section  ad-
dresses a recurring complaint of small faith-based organizations—that certain government 
agencies have refused to consider grant applicants with religious names or those who use 
facilities containing religious art or icons—with a narrowly tailored solution. Specifically, it 
states that an applicant may not be disqualified from competing for government grants 
and contracts because it imposes religious criteria for membership on its governing board, 
its chartering provisions contain religious language, it has a religious name, or because the 
applicant uses facilities containing religious art, icons scriptures or other symbols. These 
provisions do not relieve any applicant from meeting all other grant criteria.”). 
207 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 59, at 8. 
208 Exec. Order No. 13,279, 3 C.F.R. 258 (2003), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. 601 (1996 & 
Supp. 2005). 
209 See id. 
210 See id. 
211 See Andy Humm, The Right of Religious Groups to Discriminate, Gotham Gazette, 
Mar. 2004, http://www.gothamgazette.com/article//20040302/3/900.  34  Boston College Law Review  [Vol. 48:1 
  What explains the contrasting treatment of race, gender, and so-
cial  orientation  discrimination  when  religious  groups  seek  exemp-
tions from civil rights laws? The uniqueness of the nation's struggle 
with race discrimination in education, the pervasiveness of gender-
based roles in religious practice and teachings, the more ambiguous 
treatment of gender-based distinctions in the law and in society, and 
the regional and political disagreements over sexual orientation dis-
crimination each contribute. 
  It remains an open question whether federal law permits employ-
ers subsidized by the government to avoid statutory and constitutional 
restrictions on the use of religion in employment decisions. Also unre-
solved is whether that exemption would be broad enough to shield the 
employer from claims of discrimination on the basis of the employee’s 
race, sex, pregnancy, or sexual orientation. A closer examination of the 
diverging treatment requires consideration of not only doctrinal differ-
ences but also the influences of social movements and historical strug-
gles.212 
II. Assessing the Diverging Exemptions 
  At this point in U.S. history, the legal system produces different 
treatment  for  discrimination  by  religious  groups  depending  upon 
whether the claims arise in the context of race, gender, or sexual ori-
entation.213 Religious groups risk loss of tax-exempt status if they dis-
criminate on the basis of race; religiously managed schools, however, 
may discriminate on the basis of pregnancy in employment despite 
gender equality laws; and the courts and legislatures have permitted 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by religious organi-
zations  after  key  skirmishes  on  the  question.214  Some  judges  have 
                                                                                                                      
212 The social movements addressing race, gender, and sexual orientation have each 
involved international dimensions. See generally Charles Tilly, Social Movements, 1786-
2004 (2004). 
213 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983); Little v. Wuerl, 
929 F.2d 944, 947 (3d Cir. 1991); Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. George-
town Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 5 (D.C. App. 1987). 
214 See, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Schs., 477 U.S. 619, 622–23 (1986); 
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 603; Little, 929 F.2d at 947; Gay Rights Coal., 536 A.2d at 5. For an 
argument that the Boy Scouts of America should lose its tax-exempt status due to its exclu-
sion of gays, see Russell J. Upton, Comment, Bob Jonesing Baden-Powell: Fighting the Boy Scouts 
of America’s Discriminatory Practices by Revoking its State-Level Tax-Exempt Status, 50 Am. U. L. 
Rev. 793, 800–01 (2001). The Comment focuses on denial of state tax-exemption and ac-
knowledges  that  until  the  federal  government  protects  sexual  orientation,  federal  tax-
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been willing to view overcoming discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation as a compelling governmental interest, justifying potential 
burdens on the beliefs or practices or freedom of expression of reli-
gious groups,215 while others expressly note that only racial classifica-
tions deserve greater scrutiny.216 
  Differences in legal doctrine, including importantly, differences in 
the sources of the antidiscrimination law, explain some of the diverging 
results, and the influence of social movement struggles is clear. From 
the vantage point of antidiscrimination advocates, pushing for unquali-
fied application of the equality norms is not only right normatively, but 
also wise strategically, given the example of the struggle for racial equal-
ity.217 Yet there are two considerations that call for caution from gov-
ernment  officials  and  judges.  The  particular  intensity  of  clashes  be-
tween  many  religions  and  antidiscrimination  norms  dealing  with 
gender and sexuality suggest real risks of backlash that could for the 
near-to-middle  term  harm  rather  than  help  the  interests  of  women, 
gays, and lesbians. In addition, as a normative matter, protection of re-
ligious freedom is itself a civil right, and working out room for both re-
ligious  freedom  and  freedom  from  discrimination  should  motivate 
government  officials  and  advocates  who  care  about  civil  rights,  re-
strained government, and respect across differences. 
A. Differences in Doctrine 
  Lawyerly distinctions can be drawn to sort out the different treat-
ments of religious exemptions based on racial, gender, and sexual ori-
                                                                                                                      
215 See Gay Rights Coal., 536 A.2d at 38 (viewing the eradication of sexual orientation 
discrimination as a compelling governmental interest). Elsewhere, gay student groups have 
successfully challenged university refusals of support by convincing courts that such refus-
als  were  unconstitutional  viewpoint  discrimination.  Gay  and  Lesbian  Students  Ass’n  v. 
Cohn, 850 F.2d 361, 362 (8th Cir. 1988); Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 
162, 163 (4th Cir. 1976). Perhaps ironically, a Christian student group relied in part on 
these precedents in challenging the refusal of recognition by Hastings College of Law. See 
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Mary Kay Kane, No. C 04-04484 JSW, 2006 
WL 997212, at *19 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2006). Because the student group excluded students 
who engage in or advocate homosexual conduct, the school reasoned that such exclusion 
violated the school’s own antidiscrimination rules. Id. at *2. The district court upheld the 
school’s authority to enforce such rules because they pertained to conduct, not speech. Id. 
at *24. 
216 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 597 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
217 There may thus be a division of labor required for social change; some advocates 
should push without compromise for their desired ends, other advocates should play the 
role of reasonable compromiser, and a similar division may well work within government 
offices and within religious groups in order to produce the kinds of experiments and steps 
toward change that bring along doubters and minimize the risk of mobilizing opponents. 36  Boston College Law Review  [Vol. 48:1 
entation discrimination, not to mention age and disability discrimina-
tion. Distinctions based on the source of authority help explain the re-
sults: is the authority the U.S. Constitution, federal statutory law, a state 
statute, or a local ordinance? Racial discrimination has reached clear 
constitutional  prohibition  and  an  unequivocal  federal  statutory  ban, 
while gender and pregnancy differentiation have more ambiguous con-
stitutional  status,  and  distinctions  drawn  on  sexual  orientation  are 
problematic only where they target the sexual minority for worse treat-
ment.218 
  Decades of U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpret the Fourteenth 
Amendment to ban racial exclusions from public schools.219 Racial dis-
crimination is outlawed in federal statutory law.220 The massive legisla-
tive victory of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 marked a watershed of politi-
cal  change  that  has  withstood  all  subsequent  tides  and  swings.221 
Commentators  describe  that  law  as  a  framework  statute  or  a  super-
statute, preserved despite shifts in political party dominance in national 
politics and ratified by practice and public attitudes.222 The statute’s 
extension of the civil rights norm to private conduct marks a striking 
shift from constitutional requirements that pertain only to a state ac-
tor.223 All three branches of the federal government, in successive ad-
                                                                                                                      
218 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 603; Little, 929 F.2d at 947; Gay Rights Coal., 536 
A.2d at 5. 
219 See generally Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Keyes v. Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
220 See generally The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. 2000a–2000h-c (2000)).  
221 See William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 Duke L.J. 1215, 1237 
(2001). 
222 See id. 
223 Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241, 1964, ex-
tended civil rights protection against racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination to places 
of public accommodation, where public accommodation was defined expansively through 
use of the powerful Federal Commerce Clause. This represented a notable departure from 
the pre-1964 context where the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
applied only to discrimination by state actors. Prior to the 1964 Act, attempts had been 
made to press beyond the requirement of intentional state action, most notably and suc-
cessfully in the context of school desegregation. See generally Columbus Bd. of Educ., 443 U.S. 
449; Keyes, 413 U.S. 189; Brown, 347 U.S. 483. Challenges to racial segregation also altered 
the treatment of state action in the context of property rights which had likewise been 
“fudged” to fall under the State Action Doctrine. See Geoffrey Stone et al., Constitu-
tional Law 1604 (5th ed. 2005) (discussing in editors comment that in Shelley v. Kramer, 
334 U.S. 1 (1948), the Court located a state action trigger for Fourteenth Amendment 
scrutiny in judicial enforcement of a private covenant). 
Tying Title II to the federal commerce power under the Constitution, U.S. Const. art. 
I, § 8, cl. 3, enabled the 1964 Civil Rights Act to withstand a variety of challenges due to the 
extensiveness and flexibility involved in characterizing interstate commerce that had been 
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ministrations, embraced the application of the norm against racial dis-
crimination even in collision with private religious institutions.224 
  In contrast,  evolving and at  times  ambivalent Supreme Court as-
sessments of gender-based distinctions put conflicts with religious free-
dom in a different light. No explicit term in the Constitution forbids 
gender discrimination; only the general guarantee of “equal protection” 
of the law, won in response to slavery, offers a federal constitutional ba-
sis.225 Until recently, when compared with the treatment of racial catego-
                                                                                                                      
built up through the jurisprudence. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 
241, 249 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298 (1964) (citing section 201(b) 
and (c) of Title II, which state that any “restaurant . . . principally engaged in selling food 
for consumption on the premises” is covered by the Act “if . . . it serves or offers to serve 
interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it serves . . . has moved in 
commerce”). 
Outside of the racial context, the State Action Doctrine persists in largely original 
form and results in very few instances where discrimination is encountered in the private 
realm. See Deshaney v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). Deshaney was an influ-
ential statement that the state cannot be held responsible for omissions to protect liberty 
of  citizens  against  private  actors.  See  id.  Professors  Peller  and  Tushnet  interestingly  re-
characterize  the  immobility  of  the  state  action  issue  as  tantamount  to  a  question  of 
whether the Constitution guarantees social welfare rights. See Gary Peller & Mark Tushnet, 
State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 Geo. L.J. 779, 779 (2004). This leaves, then, a 
sharp divide between private discrimination based on race, which is prohibited under the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, and discrimination based on characteristics such as gender or 
sexual orientation where protections are less assured. See infra note 226 for discussion of 
gender scrutiny. 
Also note that several other international jurisdictions do not have a state action re-
quirement in constitutional equality provisions. For a contrast of the American and Cana-
dian context, see generally Mark Tushnet, State Action, Social Welfare Rights, and the 
Judicial  Role:  Some  Comparative  Observations,  http://ccc.uchicago.edu/docs/StateAc- 
tion.pdf  (last  visited  Aug.  29,  2007).  For  comparison  with  South  Africa  see  generally 
Stephen Ellmann, A Constitutional Confluence: American “State Action” Law and the Application 
of South Africa’s Socioeconomic Rights Guarantees to Private Actors, 45 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 21 
(2002). 
224 See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 594–95, 98. Until 1978, the Church of the Latter Day 
Saints prohibited African-Americans from ascending to the priesthood. Jerald Tanner & 
Sandra Tanner, Blacks Receive LDS Priesthood, Salt Lake City Messenger, July 1978, avail-
able at http://utlm.org/newsletters/no39.htm. While the policy change was a direct result 
of internal Church dialogue, peripheral legal challenges prompted Church commentators 
to suggest that discrimination policies would not stand against a legal challenge. For an 
account of the Church’s response to a 1974 racial discrimination suit filed by the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (the “NAACP”) against a Mormon 
sponsored scout group, see id. For a history of internal racial debate within the church 
along with an account of the NAACP challenge, see id. 
225 See Reva Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and 
the Family, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 947, 953–54 (2002) [hereinafter Siegel, She the People] (discuss-
ing how the Fourteenth Amendment equal rights protection was extended to gender by 
analogy with racial discrimination and suggesting revitalizing gender equal protection by 
reading the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments together). For a discussion of the 
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rization, gender-based distinctions triggered less demanding scrutiny by 
the Supreme Court.226 Even now, the level of scrutiny the Supreme Court 
demands for governmentally enforced sex distinctions is ambiguous and 
not as vigorous as the review of racial discrimination.227 The Court, as a 
result, has countenanced laws and programs predicated on “inherent 
differences” between men and women.228 The leading case, United States 
v. Virginia, decided by the Supreme Court in 1996, rejected the gender 
exclusive admission practices of the Virginia Military Institute, but could 
have come out another way if a truly comparable female-only alternative 
existed.229 The federal government has loosened previous regulatory re-
strictions on single sex education and now offers public schools flexibility 
on this score.230 To this day, the Court has not treated the use of preg-
                                                                                                                      
limits of the Equal Protection Amendment as applied to gender, particularly United States v. 
Morrison, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2003, see generally Robert Post & Reva 
Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Ki-
mel, 110 Yale L.J. 441 (2000). 
226 In 1976 the Supreme Court in Craig v. Boren announced a distinct standard of re-
view for gender equal protection analysis as one of intermediate scrutiny, situated some-
where between the higher racial discrimination standard of strict scrutiny and lesser forms 
of rational connection review. See 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). To 
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that this lower level of scrutiny implies a distinct and subordinate conception of the impact 
of gender discrimination. See Siegel, She the People, supra note 225, at 955–56. The Supreme 
Court in 1996 announced a heightened standard of review for gender equal protection in 
United States v.Virginia (VMI) though the standard and the resulting jurisprudence remains 
less than clear. See 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). The Court indicated in VMI that gender dis-
tinctions will be upheld only under “exceedingly persuasive” governmental interests. See id. 
Commentators suggest that this new formulation amounts to a step towards strict scrutiny, 
but the operational standard of scrutiny implementation remains unclear. See Reva Siegel, 
She the People, supra note 225, at 1044. 
227 See VMI, 518 U.S. at 533. 
228 See id. 
229 Id. at 547, 553. The separate but equal principle, unacceptable in the racial dis-
crimination context, finds currency in the majority judgment of VMI. See id. at 554. In VMI, 
establishment of a women’s counterpart college to the all-male military institute was ruled 
to inadequately remedy gender discrimination because the resources and quality of the 
women’s college was deemed below that of the men’s college. Id. at 551. The majority 
judgment posits continued reliance on the natural difference gender principle that can, 
under even this heightened scrutiny, justify some level of discrimination. Id. at 533–34. For 
commentary on single-sex education, see Jill Hasday, The Principle and Practice of Women’s 
“Full Citizenship”: A Case Study of Sex-Segregated Public Education, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 755, 757–
58 (2002). 
230 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 (2006); see Kimberly J. Robinson, Constitutional Lessons for the Next 
Generation of Public Single-Sex Elementary and Secondary Schools 2 (Emory Univ. Sch. of Law 
Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 05-28, 2005), available at 
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nancy  as  a  gender-based  distinction  for  equal  protection  purposes.231 
Separate  public  schooling  of  boys  and  girls—a  separate-but-equal  ap-
proach—has remained permissible.232 
  Congress  explicitly  banned  gender  discrimination  in  employ-
ment—including discrimination on the basis of pregnancy233—but, re-
flecting political compromise, the statute permits religious employers 
to use religious grounds in employment decisions, leaving ambiguous 
the status of religiously informed gender discrimination.234 The chief 
ambiguity is whether that exemption can be broad enough to cover 
decisions  that  would  otherwise  be  viewed  as  gender-  or  pregnancy-
based discrimination.235 
  In contrast, there is no federal statute prohibiting discrimination 
in employment or public accommodations on the basis of sexual orien-
tation236 and limited constitutional scrutiny articulated by the courts. 
The movement for gay and lesbian civil rights has not succeeded na-
                                                                                                                      
231 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974). Never overturned, Geduldig v. Aiello 
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nancy as part of the category of gender in other contexts. See Int’l Union v. Johnson Con-
trols, Inc. 499 U.S. 187, 197 (1991); Turner v. Dep’t of Employment Sec. of Utah, 423 U.S. 
44, 46 (1975). For commentary, see generally David Cohen, Title IX: Beyond Equal Protection, 
28 Harv. Women’s L.J. 217 (2005). 
232 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 (2006). Deference to religious groups in the conduct of public 
schooling is not, however, permissible. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Gru-
met, 512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994). The Court of Appeals of New York gave limited considera-
tion of sex segregation and coeducation in the public school district exclusively used by 
Hasidic Jews before the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the district for being too favorable in 
its design to the one religious community it exclusively served. See id.; Grumet v. Bd. of 
Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist., 618 N.E.2d 94, 96 (N.Y. 1993). 
233 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) prohibits discrimination in the employment context on the basis 
of “sex,” which include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, 
childbirth,  or  related  medical  conditions.  42  U.S.C.  § 2000e(k)  (2000).  Pregnancy  and 
gender  protections  were  expanded  by  amendments  to  Title  VII  in  the  Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act (1978), and the Family and Medical Leave Act. Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076, 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)), Family 
and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2000). For a description of current protections, see 
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, Pregnancy Discrimination (May 17, 2007), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/types/pregnancy.html. 
234 The exemption for religious employers states: 
This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of 
aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation, association, educational 
institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular 
religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, 
association, educational institution, or society of its activities. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). 
235 See id. § 2000e(k). 
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tionally to the degree that is has succeeded in some states and locali-
ties.237 Hence, religious groups can point to federal constitutional pro-
tection  for  their  religious  freedom  in  order  to  trump  state  or  local 
antidiscrimination laws. 
  Shifting constitutional treatment does seem to reflect effects of the 
social movement that targeted sodomy laws, restrictions on marriage, 
and military exclusions.238 On the constitutional front, the Court has 
protected sexual minorities against targeted stigmatizing exclusions but 
has never applied rigorous scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause 
in sexual orientation cases and still provides less than the strictest scru-
tiny for gender discrimination.239 Scholars debate whether these rulings 
point toward a reading of the Constitution that rejects discouragement 
of homosexuality or instead simply forbids majorities from designating 
any group as a pariah.240 The Federal Constitution currently operates as 
an outer check on majorities that consider denigrating, or excluding 
from the rights enjoyed by others, any individual identified on the basis 
of sexual orientation.241 Federal constitutional protection to some ad-
                                                                                                                      
237 President Clinton banned sexual orientation in federal employment, but imple-
mented the “Don’t Ask/Don’t Tell” policy that still permitted discharges from the military 
for  individuals  whose  identification  as  gay,  lesbian,  bisexual,  or  transgendered  became 
known. See Christopher Anders, Lesbian and Gay Rights During President Clinton's Sec-
ond Term: A Working Paper Published by the Citizens' Commission on Civil Rights (Jan. 
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Sexuality, Public Policy, and Civil Rights (John D'Emilio et al. eds., 2002). 
239  See  Lawrence,  539  U.S.  at  578 (rejecting  law criminalizing  homosexual  sodomy); 
VMI, 518 U.S. at 533 (rejecting exclusion of women from state military academy under a 
heightened mid-level scrutiny analysis); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996) (re-
jecting state referendum forbidding preferences, protected status, or claim of discrimina-
tion on the basis of homosexuality); Michael M. v. Sonoma County Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 
464, 467 (1981) (upholding gender difference in treatment of statutory rape due to natu-
ral sanctions that deter females). 
240 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632; Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 
Const. Comment. 257, 257, 269–70 (1996). 
241 Compare Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 
13 (1996) with Farber & Sherry, supra note 240, at 258. See also Andrew Koppelman, Romer 
v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 89, 93 (1997) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court looks to legislative purpose and permits moral judgments but forbids im-
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vocates also seems modest and even constraining when contrasted with 
a broad conception of sexual freedom.242 
  Hence, federal law provides the civil rights norms on race and 
gender from which religious groups would need exemptions; but sex-
ual orientation antidiscrimination norms depend on cities and states 
for their source of law and can be trumped by federal protection for 
religious freedom.243 Neither national consensus nor federal power 
squarely guards against sexual orientation discrimination.244 
  Legal  analysis  further  distinguishes  religious  groups’  claims  of 
exemption when they are acting entirely as private employers from 
those when they are acting as contracting partners with a government 
entity.245  More  room  for  private  decisions  contrary  to  civil  rights 
norms seems to be acceptable, looking at current practices, where the 
organization is not receiving public dollars.246 When it is a partner 
with the government under a contract or receiving a grant, however, 
the religious organization has more difficulty explaining how its dis-
criminatory actions are not subsidized by the government.247 
  Should antidiscrimination law apply without exception to the reli-
gious group that benefits from advantageous tax treatment? Religious 
groups currently benefit both from exemption from direct taxes and 
from donors’ tax deductions for the private donations that it receives. A 
tax exemption has the same financial benefit as a direct subsidy, but the 
public appearance is different. This is especially the case when the tax 
exemption is long-standing, and its removal could seem punitive. When 
it comes to tax-exempt status, the organization may claim to be acting 
as a purely private party, but many others would view the tax exemption 
as a subsidy, and surely it has the same cash value as a subsidy. If the tax 
exemption is a subsidy, then it too should warrant a higher level of 
concern about exemptions from civil rights laws.248 A similar analysis 
would apply to the deduction afforded to donors; not only are they re-
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1615, 1632 (2004). 
243 Again, localities cannot irrationally single out gays, lesbians, or transgendered peo-
ple for burdens. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 
244 See supra notes 176–212 and accompanying text. 
245 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 59, at 5–6. 
246 See id. 
247 See id. 
248 The distinction between tax exemptions and a public subsidy reflects the distinc-
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ceiving a government inducement, but the recipient organization also 
benefits from such a government policy while the public coffers get 
less. 
  The possibility of grants or vouchers to pervasively religious or-
ganizations is a new development, permitted under shifting construals 
of the Establishment Clause.249 A government contract or grant pro-
gram that discriminates does so with direct government funding, and 
the  objection  to  governmentally  subsidized  discrimination  seems 
strong. Where the government’s funding flows through vouchers given 
to individuals who choose a religious vendor, there is a modest break in 
the link between government subsidy and the discriminatory conduct 
of the religious group, and some courts may find that sufficient dis-
tance from the state action.250 
  Act-omission,  public-private,  and  federal-state-local  distinctions 
can be used to produce different legal treatments for religious ex-
emptions from civil rights laws, but these distinctions have each at 
times become insignificant in the context of racial discrimination.251 
These distinctions come to matter when the antidiscrimination norm 
does not overcome competing values, whether due to abstract norma-
tive argument or sheer political force. 
B. Prudential Concerns 
  As relevant as these legal doctrines and distinctions are to lawyers 
and judges, they reflect rather than illuminate deeper arguments and 
influences affecting religious exemptions from civil rights laws. Debat-
ing  whether  religious  groups  should  ever  receive  exemptions  from 
civil rights laws means facing up to real and profound conflicts be-
tween ideals. Accommodating religious groups requires that govern-
ment actors say “no” to civil rights advocates and to individuals who 
otherwise would receive civil rights protections. Exemptions from civil 
rights laws vitiate or shrink those public policies. Because of the size 
of relevant religious groups, exemptions would enormously affect the 
number of workplaces and other settings where the antidiscrimina-
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tion norm is bent or broken.252 Even carefully arranged accommoda-
tions for religious groups may make the government seem complicit 
in violations of civil rights or inadequately vigilant in their enforce-
ment, raising potential Establishment Clause problems as well. And 
why should only religious groups receive exemptions? If the exemp-
tion  is  expanded  to  include  nonreligious  groups  who  are  similarly 
situated, that would reduce disparate treatment between religious and 
secular groups, but further interfere with the fulfillment of the civil 
rights norms. Yet failing to accommodate religious groups carries its 
own risks. Failing to exempt religious groups directly threatens them 
with sanctions for beliefs.253 Government refusal of exemptions, deni-
als of tax-exempt status, and exclusion of religious groups from con-
tracts  and  partnerships  with  government  available  to  others  each 
carry practical burdens that could pressure religious groups to depart 
from  their  principles.254  Nonaccommodation  can  coerce  religious 
groups, or drive the groups away from public life, or even from the 
country.255  When  members  of  the  Wisconsin  Amish  community 
sought an exemption for their children from compulsory school at-
tendance at public high school, they seriously discussed leaving the 
country if the U.S. Supreme Court denied them the exemption.256 
Religious people who have traveled here for religious freedom may 
well move again, or mobilize to fight back.257 
  Religious groups, once mobilized to fight against civil rights re-
forms, can be effective in ways that make life worse for the intended 
beneficiaries of the reforms.258 Backlash to progressive social change 
                                                                                                                      
252 See Answers.com Religious Organizations (SIC 8661) U.S. Industry Profile, www.an- 
swers.com/topic/religious-organizations?cat=biz-fin (last visited Aug. 17, 2007) (summa-
rizing statistics on religion in the United States). For example, the Catholic Church was 
the  largest  religious  body  in  the  United  States  with  61.2  million  members  and  33,000 
churches. See id. 
253 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–19 (1971). 
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can  produce  newly  restrictive  treatment,  undermine  initial  reforms, 
erode public support for the government that was pursuing the reform, 
and further mobilize reactionary forces with even broader agendas for 
retrenchment. In addition, backlash can eliminate informal accommo-
dations that may have taken place and produce rigidity in the positions 
taken by competing groups that otherwise might reach practical ac-
commodations.259 
  Prudential  concerns  about  minimizing  conflict  are  misplaced 
where conflict is  the only route to challenge oppression; prudential 
concerns may also attach to government actors more than to advocates, 
whose agitation shifts the parameters of debate and hence the location 
of the middle ground. But in the specific context of conflict between 
religious freedom and antidiscrimination, prudential concerns take on 
special  significance  for  government  actors  and  even  for  some  advo-
cates. For if the government imposes public norms contrary to deeply 
felt religious beliefs without exception, the costs that emerge include 
the loss of freedoms to all and the destruction of a pluralist society. 
  State rejection of religious beliefs is a sign of totalitarianism.260 As 
long as a majority of Americans identify themselves as religious, sympa-
thies for suppressed religious practices can mount even across religious 
groups that do not share the suppressed practice.261 Pressing compli-
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practice in the case, with amicus briefs submitted by groups as diverse as Americans United 
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ance with public norms can make religious groups or individuals into 
martyrs or foster conflict between nonreligious and religious groups.262 
Further, the application of secular norms to religious groups can smack 
of a kind of arrogance and singularity of vision that neglects the goods 
represented by the religious groups and mistakenly treats the govern-
ment’s law as supreme in the eyes of all in the polity. For many who are 
devoted to a religion, the state’s policy and law are relevant but hardly 
the last or most important word.263 
  Even  federal  constitutional  law,  the  highest  law  in  the  United 
States, can be viewed as simply one among multiple sources of norma-
tive commitments held by people in this land.264 Robert Cover offered 
this  provocative  idea  in  his  influential  work  on  law  and  normative 
communities.265 Using Bob Jones University v. United States as a central ex-
ample, he explored the conflict about meanings in people’s lives within 
the nation-state and between the nation-state and a religious commu-
nity.266 Cover argued that the state inevitably views any source of norms 
that  clash  with  its  own  legal  commitments  as  threats  and  works  to 
squelch them.267 But such rival views, rooted in texts, shared histories, 
and collective narratives, provide vital meaning and value in people’s 
lives.268 Nurtured by groups smaller than the state, and exemplified by 
religious  communities,  meaningful  subcommunities  generate  norms 
embedded in texts and histories that organize many people’s lives and 
lend them both order and a sense of significance.269 
  When subcommunities clashed with the emerging national rejec-
tion of racial discrimination, the subcommunities lost, and perhaps in 
decades hence, a similar story will be told about gender and sexual 
orientation discrimination. Yet perhaps because they pertain to rules 
and practices that lie close to the heart of many religions, gender and 
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sexual orientation practices of religious communities do not summon 
the same confident national rejection. Instead, clashes between these 
practices and antidiscrimination ideas invite the reminder that reli-
gious freedom is itself a civil right, demanding federal recognition 
and protection. In this respect, the government makes room for other 
sources of norms and meanings—and does so both to respect those 
other sources and to acknowledge the strong allegiances and political 
support that they reflect. 
  Seeing the government’s law as one source among the many can 
be disconcerting.270 But doing so, frankly, is facing up to the descriptive 
reality of many people’s lives.271 Nonreligious people may think that it is 
the secular space  that is neutral and all-encompassing, but religious 
people do not.272 For them, the secular is one of many spaces, and po-
tentially one that is threatening  to commitments and  practices held 
dear.273 And for them, government enforcement of norms contradict-
ing their beliefs is coercive and threatening. 
  Moreover,  seeing  governmental  law  as  one  normative  source 
among many can help us focus on the distinctive role for the secular 
government in a pluralistic society, and notably, a constitutional democ-
racy.274 The secular government in a plural society needs to set a frame-
work within which individuals and groups negotiate across the multiple 
sources of norms and meaning affecting them and their communities. 
That framework does—and should—rule some practices out of bounds, 
but only based on well-founded, widely held beliefs.275 Otherwise, plu-
rality itself can be jeopardized by the state’s own jealous authority.276 
  Seeing the state as a rival of other normative communities, such as 
religious  groups,  puts  the  case  for  exemptions  from  the  state’s  civil 
rights laws in a larger context.277 Always denying exemptions could be 
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part  of  a  broader  campaign  by  the  government  to  cabin  religious 
groups and their authority; always granting exemptions would put the 
secular  state  in  a  tenuous  position  as  arbiter  of  values  or  source  of 
norms for public life. Yet creating grounds for when to grant and when 
to deny exemptions on a case-by-case basis poses its own difficulties. 
The state could approach the case-by-case determination by assessing 
the sincerity of the religious belief proffered as the basis for the exemp-
tion, or its centrality in relation to the religious group and its beliefs 
and practices.278 Some may think that the willingness of Bob Jones Uni-
versity ultimately to adapt to the public rule, and end exclusion of Afri-
can-Americans from admission, gives a clue that its racial exclusion pol-
icy was not central to its mission.279 Yet making such an assessment as a 
governmental decision is not a wise step. It would jeopardize the free 
exercise of religion and risk government establishment of particular 
religions or beliefs if the government decides which religious beliefs 
and practices are core and which ones instead are dispensable.280 
C. Summarizing the Options 
  There should be more options than either granting or denying 
all religious group requests for exemptions from civil rights.281 Always 
granting exemptions subverts the civil rights norms.282 Never granting 
them  disparages  religious  beliefs  and  coerces  religious  believers, 
which is a loss not only to them but also to a nation committed to plu-
ralism and benefited by the contributions religious groups bring to 
their  members  and  to  the  larger  society.283  A  third  option,  already 
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demn polygamy); Cude v. State, 377 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Ark. 1964) (public interest in vacci-
nation). 
281 See Introduction to Taking Faith Seriously 4–5 (Mary Jo Bane et al. eds., 2005). 
282 See id. 
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noted,284 is to grant exemptions not only to religious groups, but to 
other groups that make comparable accommodation requests based 
on conscience rather than spiritual tenets.285 Some scholars argue that 
only such extensions of accommodations to secular groups can save 
accommodations  of  religious  groups  from  charges  of  illicit  prefer-
ence.286 Yet each additional exemption curtails the application of the 
overarching norm—and civil rights laws as a result can be too easily 
and thoroughly undermined. 
  Another option already considered here would be to permit exemp-
tions but not subsidies. A private religious employer under this option 
could discriminate on the basis of religion, even when that discrimina-
tion encompasses the gender or sexual orientation of an employee—but 
the government would withdraw this permission when the religious em-
ployer receives public funding through a contract, grant, or voucher.287 
One more option has already been shown to be problematic: the gov-
ernment could look to the centrality of the religious belief in deciding 
whether to permit an exemption,288 but this would draw government 
actors into assessments of religious tenets in a way that conventional un-
derstandings of the Establishment Clause would prohibit.289 Are there 
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286 See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 285, at 1268. 
287 See, e.g., Teen Ranch v. Udow, 389 F. Supp. 2d 827, 830 (W.D. Mich. 2005). Similar 
efforts address the potential collision between religious freedom and protection from dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See, e.g., Josiah N. Drew, Comment, Caught 
Between the Scylla and Charybdis: Ameliorating the Collision Course of Sexual Orientation Anti-
Discrimination Rights and Religious Free Exercise Rights in the Public Workplace, 16 BYU J. Pub. L. 
287 (2002). 
288  See,  e.g.,  Graham,  822  F.2d  at  851.  Perhaps  the  Supreme  Court  implicitly  tested 
whether the racially discriminatory policies at issue in the Bob Jones University case were 
central to the religious beliefs behind the university—and found that they were not, given 
the university’s ultimate alteration of its policies. See supra note 81 & 112 and accompany-
ing text. It would be more difficult for a secular observer to assert that the Baptist social 
service agency did not reflect central tenets of its religious sponsor in firing the lesbian 
employee, especially as the agency leadership indicated it would renounce any public aid 
rather than forgo its policy on the subject. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
289  See,  e.g.,  Smith,  494  U.S.  at  886–87.  Exemptions  from  public  antidiscrimination 
norms may be sought by private religious groups even when they receive “subsidized” pub-
lic funding: but such governmental support for private discrimination might run afoul of 
the Fourteenth Amendment of state or federal civil rights laws. At the same time, regula-
tion of private religious groups could interfere with the religious nature—and public sub-
sidy of pervasively religious activities could run afoul of the Establishment Clause. The 
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any approaches to the potential conflicts between religious groups and 
civil rights laws, besides picking one of these options? 
III. Negotiating the Conflict 
  Negotiation, especially with the strategy of identifying solutions 
that satisfy the religious groups and the civil rights advocates, can be a 
meaningful option—but not in a climate of pitched conflict over val-
ues.  An illustration  comes  with  events  surrounding  San Francisco’s 
policy mandating that its contracting partners provide domestic part-
ner benefits equal to those that they offer spouses.290 Among the or-
ganizations affected, the Salvation Army did not have a direct prob-
lem with the policy because it provided no benefits, but the Roman 
Catholic Archdiocese immediately registered opposition and sought 
an exemption. As Archbishop William Levada later explained: 
  I pointed out that the ordinance as written created a problem 
of conscience for agencies of the Catholic Church (and perhaps 
others), because it required that we change our Church’s inter-
nal benefits policies to recognize domestic partnership as equiva-
lent to marriage. 
  This requirement, I argued, amounted to government coer-
cion of a church to compromise its own beliefs about the sa-
credness of marriage, and seemed to violate the First Amend-
ment protection guaranteed to religion by our Constitution.291 
The Archbishop made it clear he would sue on free exercise grounds 
if the policy were enforced against church agencies.292 But he also 
went further, and drew on church teachings to criticize the city’s pol-
icy as inadequate in policy terms: 
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On neutrality, see generally Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutral-
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342–45 (1999) (arguing that a neutrality principle is discriminatory). In general, the Es-
tablishment Clause is meant to protect religions from the state as well as to protect the 
state from religion. See Ira C. Lupu, Religion Clauses and Justice Brennan in Full, 87 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1105, 1114 (1999). 
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I am in favor of increasing benefits, especially health coverage, 
for anyone. As the Catholic bishops of the U.S. stated in 1993, 
“Every person has a right to adequate health care.” I would 
welcome the opportunity to work with city officials to find ways 
to overcome what I believe is a national shame, the fact that so 
many  Americans  have  no  health  coverage  at  all.  I  can  be 
counted on to raise my voice in support of universal health 
coverage nationally and locally. I feel sure I could make com-
mon cause with city officials in working toward this truly urgent 
need.293 
  In  response  to  Archbishop  Levada’s  comments,  Mayor  Willie 
Brown and four members of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors 
asked to meet with the Archbishop to see if they could reach a mutu-
ally acceptable solution to the problem.294 They met, they talked, and 
they  negotiated  a  solution  that  addressed  the  concerns  of  both 
sides.295 As a result, the city now deems a contracting party to be in 
compliance if it “allows each employee to designate a legally domi-
ciled  member  of  the  employee’s  household  as  being  eligible  for 
spousal  equivalent  benefits.”296  As  the  city  currently  explains  in  its 
overview of  the  ordinance,  contracting  parties  can  achieve  compli-
ance in different ways: 
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  But I reject the notion that it discriminates against homosexual, or un-
married  heterosexual,  domestic  partners  if  they  do  not  receive  the  same 
benefits society has provided to married employees to help maintain their 
families. If it is a question of benefits, why should not blood relatives, or an 
elderly person or a child who lives in the same household, enjoy these same 
benefits?  Under  the  city’s  new  ordinance,  however,  blood  relatives  are  ex-
cluded from the benefits that the city’s new ordinance extends to domestic 
partners. 
  Historically social legislation providing spousal benefits for married per-
sons has recognized the role that women traditionally exercised as wives and 
mothers, and the important function they contribute to the future of society 
by their unpaid work in the home raising their families. Even with today’s 
changes in the workplace, to seek to equate domestic partnership with the in-
stitution of marriage and family runs contrary to Catholic teaching, indeed to 
the beliefs of most religious and cultural traditions, and as recent polls have 
shown, to the basic convictions of the great majority of Americans.  
Id. 
294 Id. 
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  Some  contractors  comply  with  the  requirements  of  the 
Ordinance by offering benefits to spouses, domestic partners 
and other individuals. One company, for example, has cre-
ated a policy that extends some benefits to “other individuals 
if the relationship with [the employee] is especially close and 
it would be normal for them to turn to [the employee] for 
care and assistance.” Other contractors comply by allowing 
each employee to extend benefits to one adult living in their 
household. Compliance also is possible where the benefits 
offered do not extend to spouses or domestic partners, or 
where no employee benefits are offered.297 
  The Archbishop acknowledged criticism of the solution, but he 
defended it. Hence, he explained: 
[T]o those like my local Catholic critics who say that we implic-
itly give recognition to domestic partnerships by not excluding 
them from benefits, I must demur. Under our plan, an em-
ployee may indeed elect to designate another member of the 
household to receive benefits. We would know no more or no 
less about the employee’s relationship with that person than we 
typically  know  about  a  designated  life  insurance  beneficiary. 
What we have done is to prohibit local government from forc-
ing our Catholic agencies to create internal policies that recog-
nize  domestic  partnerships  as  a  category  equivalent  to  mar-
riage.298 
The solution avoided costly and potentially bitter litigation between the 
city  and  the  Church,  and  the  two  parties  worked  together,  as  the 
Archbishop said, to “help address many pressing social needs.”299 
  No comparable resolution has been pursued for the recent con-
flict between free exercise of religion and nondiscrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation in Massachusetts in the context of adoption 
agencies.300 State law requires adoption agencies contracting with the 
state not to discriminate against same-sex couples who seek to adopt 
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298 Levada, supra note 291, at 18–19. 
299 Id. at 19. 
300 See Wen, supra note 3. 52  Boston College Law Review  [Vol. 48:1 
children.301 The policy has been in place for some time, even before 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 2003 construed the state 
constitution to reject a marriage law that forbade same-sex couples to 
marry in Goodridge v. Department of Health.302 In October 2005 the Bos-
ton Globe reported that Catholic Charities of Boston, a major contrac-
tor  with  the Commonwealth  of Massachusetts, had  placed  approxi-
mately thirteen children in households with gay or lesbian parents 
among the 720 children placed over two decades.303 This news story 
precipitated a public crisis for Catholic Charities in Boston that cul-
minated in the agency’s withdrawal from the adoption work it had 
pursued for over one hundred years.304 As of 2005, Catholic Charities 
in Boston handled approximately thirty-one percent of the city’s “spe-
cial needs” adoptions, placing children who are between five and fif-
teen years old, who may have disabilities or serious psychological emo-
tional problems, or who are otherwise difficult to place.305 
  The Boston Globe report triggered several reactions within Catho-
lic Charities, the broader Catholic community, and the larger polity.306 
The  state’s  four  bishops  convened  a  review  panel.307  The  Catholic 
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303 See Wen, supra note 3. 
304 See id. 
305 Interview with Rev. Bryan Hehir, President, Catholic Charities of Boston (Apr. 17, 
2006) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with Rev. Hehir]. 
306 See Wen, supra note 3. 
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Charities board, which is dominated by lay people, voted unanimously 
to continue to permit the organization to place children with gay and 
lesbian parents.308 When the Bishops requested an exemption from 
the  Commonwealth’s  antidiscrimination  requirements,  seven  mem-
bers of the lay board resigned in protest.309 
  Governor Mitt Romney, perhaps in anticipation of a run for the 
Republican presidential nomination, introduced legislation authoriz-
ing a religious exemption for state contractors, but he and his sup-
porters emphasized that it would exempt religious providers only for 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, not discrimination 
based on race, national origin, gender, or handicap.310 Yet Governor 
Romney’s  proposed  exemption  represented  a  purely  symbolic  ges-
ture, because from the start, it had no chance in the Massachusetts 
legislature.311 Democratic leaders in the legislature voiced opposition, 
as did Republican Lieutenant Governor Kerry Healy, herself a candi-
date for governor.312 
  The  entire  issue  had  been  brewing,  as  it  turns  out,  for  several 
years, and well beyond Boston Catholic Charities.313 A 2003 document 
from the Vatican Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith stated that 
it would be “gravely immoral” to let same-sex couples adopt children.314 
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htm. 
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the  Vatican  document  emerged  from  work  undertaken  before  that  time—perhaps, 
though, on the same time line as the gay rights advocates who also worked long before 
2003 for the marriage ruling. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948. The Vatican document ex-
plains, “Allowing children to be adopted by persons living in such unions would actually 
mean doing violence to these children, in the sense that their condition of dependency 
 54  Boston College Law Review  [Vol. 48:1 
Rev. H. Bryan Hehir, president of Catholic Charities of Boston, fully 
acknowledged the Vatican document’s position and expressed no con-
fusion about its view, but struggled to help the agency reconcile the 
Vatican’s position with the mission behind the adoption work.315 
  The financial risk of losing the public contracts was not the issue 
for Catholic Charities, as the adoption-related services accounted for 
only about $1 million of reimbursements for Boston Catholic Charities 
in 2005, out of total revenue of approximately $37 million.316 Thus, giv-
ing up the adoption work was not a major budgetary concern.317 But 
the adoption work carried large symbolic and theological significance. 
The  agency  had  engaged  in  adoption  work  since  its  founding  in 
1903.318 Theologically, care for orphans, widows, and the poor stands in 
a  central  place  for  Catholics,  as  does  work  to  prevent  abortion.319 
Catholic Charities also provided a valuable service to the community in 
specializing in the particularly challenging special needs placements.320 
There are not enough homes ready or willing to take children with se-
vere disabilities or psychological issues, and the children in need spend 
years in foster care, often moving among multiple placements.321 
  The agency did on occasion match children with single parents.322 
A  Massachusetts  court  decision  in  the  1980s  permitted  such  place-
ments, and Catholic Charities did not interrogate potential single par-
ents about their private sexual lives, even when state law later permitted 
placements of children with lesbian or gay parents323 in order to put 
the children’s interests first.324 As the firestorm broke over placements 
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by Catholic Charities with lesbian or gay parents, Rev. Hehir argued in 
November 2005 that such placements for foster children could some-
times be permitted under Catholic moral teaching as an instance of 
“material cooperation,” or a kind of lesser evil.325 Rev. Hehir explained 
to the National Catholic Register that homosexual placement “is never 
a good fit” for Catholic Charities, but could still be the best choice that 
could be made under the circumstances, given the children’s needs 
and the state’s contract requiring nondiscriminatory placements.326 
  As the issue spread through national and international news, Rev. 
Hehir and Boston Archbishop Sean Patrick O’Malley met with Gover-
nor Romney to explore the possibility of an exemption, but Romney 
said he had no authority on his own to grant one.327   Catholic Charities 
leaders considered their options.328 Rev. Hehir noted that a court chal-
lenge would cost ‘‘too much time and energy” without any certainty of 
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victory.329 Furthermore, continued struggle over this issue could detract 
from the 130 other programs at Catholic Charities, including food pan-
tries, daycare services, immigration legal clinics, and substance abuse 
programs.330 
  So the president and board chair of Boston’s Catholic Charities 
announced on March 10, 2006 that the agency would get out of the 
adoption business entirely rather than pursue an exemption.331 In their 
joint statement, Rev. J. Bryan Hehir and Jeffrey Kaneb explained: 
At all times we sought to place the welfare of children at the 
heart of our work. 
  But now, we have encountered a dilemma we cannot resolve. 
In spite of much effort and analysis, Catholic Charities of Bos-
ton finds that it cannot reconcile the teaching of the Church, 
which guides our work, and the statutes and regulations of the 
Commonwealth.  The  issue  is  adoption  to  same-sex  couples, 
and we realize that for many it is a sensitive, deeply felt issue of 
conscience. 
  We recognize the complexity of the issue, and we are aware 
of the debates which have swirled around it. As an agency, how-
ever, we simply must recognize that we cannot continue in this 
ministry. Therefore, we plan to begin discussions with appro-
priate  agencies  of  the  Commonwealth  to  end  our  work  in 
adoptions. We will do this in an orderly, planned fashion so that 
the  children we  have been entrusted with will be cared for, 
supported and found permanent homes.332 
  The decision received news coverage around the country.333 At 
that  very  moment,  then-Archbishop  Levada—the  same  person  who 
had worked out the arrangement in response to the San Francisco 
domestic partnership issue—was in Vatican City, about to be elevated 
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to the role of Cardinal.334 In an unusual email response to a journal-
ist’s  question,  Archbishop  and  Cardinal  Designate  Levada  acknowl-
edged  that  San  Francisco  Catholic  Charities  had  also  arranged  a 
handful of placements of teens with same-sex couples as prudential 
judgments based on the needs of the children.335 Writing from the 
Vatican, Levada concluded that henceforth, there should be no ac-
commodations  to  permit  placements  of  difficult-to-place  children 
with gay or lesbian parents.336 In fact, Cardinal Levada now serves as 
the  head  of  the  Congregation  for  the  Doctrine  of  the  Faith,  the 
source of the 2003 document condemning the practice.337 The actual 
policies of San Francisco Catholic Charities remain under review by 
the  new  Archbishop,338  and  San  Francisco  Mayor Gavin  Newsom339 
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canceled his trip to witness the elevation of Levada to Cardinal in the 
wake of the news reports. Newsom, a Catholic, explained: 
  It’s  a  cause  of  some  serious  concern  in  San  Francisco 
through Catholic Charities which has placed a lot of children 
into really very, very loving homes and the notion that they 
should be precluded from doing that is beyond me. 
  If we’re supposed to be encouraging adoption, if we’re sup-
posed to be discouraging abortion which is principled—I abso-
lutely  believe  that—then  we  also  have  to  be  encouraging 
placement in loving households. 
  Somehow inherently that two people of the same sex can’t 
be loving parents to me is patently offensive because it belies 
fact and it belies any sense of sensitivity or capacity of under-
standing.340 
  High profile publicity and adversarial stances contributed to the 
failure of accommodation over the adoption policies. The glare of 
headlines and visibility of a major group, such as Catholic Charities of 
Boston, may have made informal resolution difficult. It is noteworthy, 
in contrast, that other dioceses in Massachusetts, more removed from 
the  investigatory  gaze  of  the  Boston  Globe,  and  run  independently, 
have not thus far felt forced to leave the adoption business.341 The 
dioceses in Worcester and Fall River each work on only a small num-
ber of adoptions every year and they are still reviewing the future of 
their adoption programs.342 The smaller dioceses already have referral 
arrangements with other agencies, and may be able to refer same-sex 
couples to gain adoption assistance.343 
  Why wouldn’t this kind of cooperative referral arrangement work 
for Boston Catholic Charities? Couldn’t some alternative have been 
worked out in order to keep this long-term, vital agency in the busi-
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ness of providing care for especially vulnerable children while respect-
ing what clearly has emerged as an important theological and internal 
issue for the Church? The collision between a religious group and 
civil rights advocates resembled a clash of absolutes. It is hard not to 
see the hardening of the Vatican’s position as a reaction to the emerg-
ing state recognition of rights for gays and lesbians.344 Despite its prior 
experience with placements of a small number of children in need 
with same-sex adoptive parents, the Church hierarchy announced that 
there can be no placements countenanced with lesbian or gay par-
ents, even when the staff concludes this is a better option for a child 
who has already lost so many life chances.345 
  The Commonwealth of Massachusetts also apparently grew abso-
lutist. Why did Catholic Charities not develop an arrangement with 
another  agency  that  does  serve  gay  and  lesbian  families  through 
which  Catholic  Charities  could  refer  cases  and  work  cooperatively 
with another agency? When asked this question, Rev. Hehir replied 
that he thought a referral arrangement could work from the vantage 
point of Catholic Charities, but the representatives of the state made 
clear it would not be sufficient.346 Unless Catholic Charities itself ac-
cepted same-sex couples, it would lose its license to participate in the 
adoption practice.347 
  Here is a moment where the state’s failure to pursue an accom-
modationist strategy seems more rigid than necessary to the state’s own 
legitimate ends. The particular state officials or employees who could 
engage in discussions with leaders of religious groups necessarily de-
pends on the context, but mayors, heads of departments that contract 
with religious groups, and other leaders have and should exercise flexi-
bility in exploring practical accommodations. Unlike the school con-
text—where escape to private schools could indeed undermine the ef-
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fort to desegregate public schools348—delivery of adoption services has 
long relied upon a plurality of public and private agencies as well as 
“private placement” adoptions.349 A policy permitting Catholic charities 
to refer same-sex couples to another agency in this respect could mir-
ror the policy permitting Catholic health care providers to refer indi-
viduals seeking contraception or abortion to other providers.350 Neither 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts nor the Church explored a joint 
solution. Instead, Catholic Charities terminated its adoption practice.351 
On April 29, 2006, Catholic Charities of Boston announced it would 
transfer its adoption staff and caseload to a private agency, Child and 
Family Services, in New Bedford.352 Started by Quakers in 1843, Child 
and Family Services has worked closely with Catholic Charities in the 
past, and offered jobs to all fifteen of the social workers from the adop-
tion practice at Catholic Charities.353 Its executive director indicated 
that the agency abides by the state’s anti-discrimination laws and works 
“to identify people who have the capacity to parent.”354 This very trans-
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fer agreement again raises the question why an ongoing referral ar-
rangement would not have been satisfactory to all sides.355 
  Catholic Charities faced its tragic choice,356 and gave up part of 
its mission rather than betray firm beliefs.357 This saved the state from 
having to consider granting an exemption from the antidiscrimina-
tion norm—or more likely, overtly rejecting such an exemption—but 
both sides now have left very vulnerable children with fewer resources 
and friends.358 
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  Some  observers  on  both  sides  wish  the  matter  had  gone  to 
court.359 James Brett, a board member of Catholic Charities in Boston 
said that the board approved the termination of the adoption practice 
“with a heavy heart,” but found it preferable to a protracted battle 
over  an  exemption.360  “This  is  a  better  resolution,”  he  said,  “[i]t’s 
more straightforward.”361 At least for the foreseeable future in Massa-
chusetts, the civil rights obligation stands, and the Catholic Charities 
in Boston has withdrawn.362 More informal accommodations may well 
be at work for the other Catholic Charities in Massachusetts and in 
other communities. The state may permit collaboration and referrals 
to other agencies that accept same-sex couples given the low level of 
adoptions handled by Catholic Charities in Worcester, for example.363 
  The highest figure in the Massachusetts Catholic Church was ele-
vated  from  Archbishop  to  Cardinal  in  the  midst  of  the  dispute.364 
Cardinal Sean Patrick O’Malley recently suggested that other states 
would  have  been  more  receptive  to  requests  from  the  archdiocese 
that it be allowed to exclude gays and lesbians from adopting children 
through Catholic Charities.365 He could well be right. As of the spring 
of 2006, several state legislatures had bills introduced to permit agen-
cies contracting with the states to refrain from arranging adoptions 
for  same-sex  couples.366  Others  are  considering  the  greater  step  of 
banning  all  adoptions by  gay  and  lesbian  parents,  a  step  currently 
taken in a handful of states.367 The controversy has global dimensions. 
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In the United Kingdom, for example, proposed legislation would add 
sexual orientation to the set of illegal bases for discrimination in em-
ployment and service provision; in response, the Catholic Church has 
threatened to end all adoption services in the United Kingdom.368 
  Yet in San Francisco, in the same spirit of the domestic partner 
health benefit, Catholic Charities found a way to avoid the choice be-
tween abandoning adoption services and complying with the antidis-
crimination law in contravention of its principles. It withdrew from 
direct child placement services but joined with a nonprofit organiza-
tion that manages an Internet database of children available for adop-
tion, and assists with adoption referrals to any prospective parent, in-
cluding gays and lesbians.369 
  Certainty now drives the movement in sixteen states to ban adop-
tion by gays and lesbians altogether.370 The topic has become a ban-
ner,  reduced  to  simplistic  all-or-nothing  positions,  and  it  has  pro-
duced  a  fundraising  issue  on  both  sides.371  Perhaps  out  of  these 
struggles will come new recognition of the equal worth of each person 
and tolerance for different ways of life. But instead, new intolerance 
and desires to overcome other views may result. 
IV. A Stance of Respect and Humility 
  San Francisco’s health benefit resolution kept the Catholic provid-
ers in contractual relations with  the city.372 Massachusetts’s adoption 
resolution ended with Boston Catholic Charities withdrawing from the 
adoption business and its contracts with the state.373 The difference be-
tween  the  two  situations  resulted  from  differences  in  attitude  more 
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than substance. Both the religious and governmental leaders in San 
Francisco proceeded with a willingness to find common ground and a 
stance  of  collaborative  problem  solving—without  ceding  principle, 
however.374 Perhaps due to the glare of media and the impact of higher 
profile issues, involving the Vatican as well as local leadership, rigidity 
characterized the standoff in Massachusetts. This contrast suggests that 
attitudes of respect, flexibility, and humility can help generate new an-
swers beyond “exemption” and “no exemption” when religious princi-
ples and civil rights laws collide. The most likely agents here would be 
government officials and leaders of religious groups, and not judges, 
who are typically asked and expected to answer yes or no questions. 
Without calling for compromise on principles, the crucial step for such 
figures is treating respect, flexibility, and humility as virtues themselves, 
even when the stakes seem high and the cause just.375 Respect for the 
views of others should mean more than superficial courtesy, and yet 
even that is often hard to muster in the face of sharp and prolonged 
disagreement over views rooted in commitment.376 
  Humility is of course a virtue within many religious traditions. It 
is also central to the liberal commitment at the core of constitutional 
democracy, though less commonly so seen. The virtue of tolerance at 
the heart of freedom of speech depends on acknowledging that our 
truths  may  be  wrong,  and  should  be  tested  in  the  marketplace  of 
ideas. The wisdom of separation of powers and federalism reflects the 
recognition  of  individual  and  institutional  inadequacies  and  places 
hope in processes of mutual monitoring and checking. Might a ges-
ture of humility offer a thread of commonality even between religious 
people confident of their faith and civil rights advocates and enforc-
ers, confident of theirs? Respect for the opposing side means not pre-
suming  bad  faith  or  idiocy  motivates  the  opponents.  Flexibility  re-
quires listening and refraining from equating principled views with a 
required outcome. Humility does not mean self-doubt or doubt about 
principle, but it does involve restraint and making room for open and 
respectful exploration of the other point of view. 
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  It is in the open and respectful exploration of other points of 
view  that  negotiations  can  identify  new,  enlarged  options.377  Some-
times called value-added negotiation, generating new options can be 
pursued  to  create  alternatives  to  winner-take-all  solutions  either  by 
creating new options that can be divided across competitors or over-
lapping consensus that meets the needs of rivals.378 Negotiating across 
sharp differences will not always work. But it cannot begin unless the 
parties agree to try. 
  It is curious that many people find through a religious journey 
reasons  for  humility  but  others  grasp  certainty.  The  same  division 
marks those on a secular path, and frankly, civil rights advocates, like 
me, tend toward the certainty pole. This makes humility seem remote, 
if not simply failure of conviction. But humility could itself be under-
stood as a critical conviction and a difficult virtue to muster. 
  In his beautiful little book, How to Cure a Fanatic, Amos Oz points 
out that the fanatic is altruistic: he wants you to change.379 He calls for 
imagination and humor, so in that spirit, let me tell one of my favorite 
jokes. A rabbi is preparing for the Jewish High Holy Days, and as he 
stands before the holiest place, the Ark where the Torah is kept, he 
throws himself down on the ground and says, “Before you, oh Lord, I 
am nothing, I am but a speck of dust, bless me, and forgive me.” See-
ing the rabbi on the ground, the hazan, the cantor throws himself 
down on the ground, and says, “before you, O Master of the Universe, 
I am less than a squeak of the door, I am nothing, bless me, forgive 
me.” At  this  point,  in  the  back of  the  sanctuary  is  the janitor,  the 
shamas. He sees the rabbi on the ground, he sees the cantor on the 
ground. What’s he going to do? He too throws himself down on the 
ground. “Before you, Adonai, I am nothing I am nothing I am noth-
ing.”  The  cantor  looks  over  at  the  janitor,  and  nudges  the  rabbi, 
“Look who thinks he’s nothing!” 
  A bit more respect, flexibility, and humility on all sides in the 
clash between religious groups and advocates for rights for gays, lesbi-
ans, and transgendered people could open possibilities for resolutions 
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that accommodate civil rights norms and religious principles. Respect, 
flexibility,  and  humility  do  not  necessitate  doubt  about  one’s  own 
principles  or  right  to  advance  them,  but  these  attitudes  follow  ac-
knowledgement that the position you reject is part of a worldview that 
holds importance and value to others. These virtues centrally express 
the commitment to acknowledge the humanity of another, even an-
other with whom you disagree or whom you do not think you will ever 
fully comprehend.380 It is not self-defeating, but instead a sign of ro-
bust commitment to give latitude for those whose views you reject in 
order to advance a larger commitment to freedom and coexistence.381 
Preserving room for personal and group freedom of religion and also 
for protections against discrimination each are ideals toward which 
the society strives, even as it—as we—preserve channels for debate 
and struggle over the practical meanings of these ideals in particular 
circumstances.382 A society devoted to freedom and equality will face 
tough choices and competing losses in the effort to reconcile plural 
goods.383 Society’s commitments to freedom and equality, as well as to 
free exercise of religion and antidiscrimination norms, will lead to 
ongoing tensions and struggles over practical accommodation.384 
  There  may  be  a  necessary  division  of  labor,  as  social  move-
ments—and  perhaps  also  religious  movements—depend  upon  peo-
ple’s willingness to act with confidence and courage on their princi-
ples, and maybe even indifference to competing points of view. For 
current advocates for gender and sexual orientation rights, these are 
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questions of tactics: when is the backlash too risky, when is the contro-
versy part of the long-term fight.385 
  For government officials, picking between religious groups and 
civil rights advocates may not always be necessary, if instead there are 
avenues for accommodation. Accommodation of clashing principles 
calls for calm, resourceful problem solving, aided by respect, flexibil-
ity,  and  humility.  This  is  an  attractive  and  justifiable  avenue  where 
otherwise the government—for example, the commissioner of social 
services, the mayor, the court—would have to choose whether to ex-
empt or deny exemptions to religious groups. Either choice is likely to 
fuel reaction and further conflict. The choice of exemptions for reli-
gious groups undermines the civil rights norms and also invites fair 
arguments by nonreligious groups for exemptions as well.386 If it pur-
sued litigation, Boston Catholic Charities might lose in the Massachu-
setts courts, yet win on review in the U. S. Supreme Court, but not 
without real risks of political polarization and certain expenditures of 
enormous amounts of money, time, and energy. The choice of civil 
rights enforcement could well produce backlash if religious groups 
mobilize.  Government  officials,  including  judges,  can  rule  for  one 
side  but  they  also  then  can  prompt  backlash,  and  constitutional 
amendments,  as  the  same-sex  marriage  debates  have  shown.387  We 
cannot avoid fights over whose conceptions should govern when such 
a high degree of disagreement exists.388 
Conclusion 
  Our Constitution embraces, without resolving, the deep tensions 
between  religious  freedom  and  equality.  The Constitution  provides 
some resources, especially in language and ideals, for thinking and 
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arguing; it devises structures and institutions within which to argue 
and persuade, mobilize, and challenge others. We do not in the ab-
stract resolve the tension between respecting religious groups and en-
suring each individual protection against discrimination; nor do we 
resolve  it  quickly.  Instead,  we  struggle  over  time,  in  courts,  legisla-
tures, private settings,389 and complex negotiations. The war against 
slavery and then the movements against discrimination on the basis of 
race transformed society, politics, and law. These leading examples in 
the emerging accounts of “popular constitutionalism,” document the 
dynamic interactions between and among social movements, canoni-
cal  texts  like  the  U.S.  Constitution,  and  the  formal  institutions  of 
lawmaking.390 Struggles spill over to legislative debates, even without 
producing  legislation,  and  affect  popular  understandings,391  while 
litigation educates and mobilizes people on several sides of an issue 
and generates the kinds of conversations over dinner tables and in-
formal arrangements that also produce practical change. 
  As the U.S. Supreme Court in Bob Jones University v. United States 
acknowledged, the hard-earned political victories and complex histori-
cal experiences do and must inform what the Court does when it faces 
a conflict as profound as one between religious liberty and freedom 
from racial discrimination.392 A constitutional democracy is made not 
by the words written on a page and not even by elegant normative ar-
guments that balance competing commitments. It is made by the peo-
ple who use the channels created by and sustaining self-government, 
conditioned  by  institutionalized  and  vigilant  attention  to  individual 
rights. The struggles over exemptions from civil rights laws for religious 
groups reflect historic political battles, inspired but not dictated by ide-
als and hammered out through shifts in power from popular mobiliza-
tion and changes of heart. We make history as we negotiate our plural 
commitments—and the very “we-ness” of this process makes it inap-
propriate for any one person to announce the right resolution of reli-
gious freedom and antidiscrimination. The very process of reaching for 
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a right answer when these goods clash demands acknowledgment that 
no one, alone, can reach it.393 
  Direct confrontation and conflicts will play a role in resolutions, 
but so should efforts at accommodation. Accommodation and nego-
tiation can identify practical solutions where abstract principles some-
times  cannot—and,  in  the  meantime,  build  mutual  trust.  Until  re-
cently,  Catholic  Charities  in  Boston  and  San  Francisco  arranged  a 
small number of adoptions for special needs kids in homes of gays or 
lesbians—because all parties involved recognized that this meant bet-
ter options for the kids.394 
  Adlai Stevenson was a failed presidential candidate, but a success-
ful diplomat and wise observer of public affairs. He famously said, 
“Eggheads  of  the  world,  unite!  You  have  nothing  to  lose  but  your 
yolks!” He also said that he believed “that if we really want human 
brotherhood to spread and increase until it makes life safe and sane, 
we must also be certain that there is no one true faith or path by 
which it may spread.”395 The certainty of the vision requires the humil-
ity of the approach. 
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